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Abstract 
The goal of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was to achieve nearly universal health insurance 
coverage through a combination of mandates, subsidies, marketplaces, and Medicaid expansions, 
most of which took effect in 2014. We use data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System to examine the impacts of the ACA on health care access, risky health behaviors, and 
self-assessed health after two years. We estimate difference-in-difference-in-differences models 
that exploit variation in treatment intensity from state participation in the Medicaid expansion 
and pre-ACA uninsured rates. Results suggest that the ACA led to sizeable improvements in 
access to health care in both Medicaid expansion and non-expansion states, with the gains being 
larger in expansion states along some dimensions. No statistically significant effects on risky 
behaviors or self-assessed health emerge for the full sample. However, we find some evidence 
that the ACA improved self-assessed health among older non-elderly adults, particularly in 
expansion states.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The goal of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was to achieve nearly 
universal health insurance coverage in the United States through a combination of policies 
largely implemented in 2014 (Obama, 2016). Several recent studies, including Frean et al. (2016) 
and Courtemanche et al. (2017), have shown that the ACA led to gains in insurance coverage. 
The objective of this paper is to evaluate whether or not such coverage increases translated to 
changes in access to care, risky health behaviors, and, ultimately, short-run health outcomes.  
A number of 2014 ACA provisions involved overhauling non-group insurance markets in 
an effort to ensure that one’s health history did not provide a barrier to obtaining coverage. 
Specific regulations included guaranteed issue, which forbids insurers from denying coverage on 
the basis of applicant health status, and modified community rating, which imposes uniform 
premiums regardless of observable characteristics aside from age and smoking status. In 
addition, the federal government established a Health Insurance Marketplace to facilitate 
insurance purchases for individuals and small businesses. Each state was given the option of 
establishing their own insurance marketplace and fifteen did so in 2014 (KFF, 2014).    
 These reforms alone would likely lead to an adverse selection death spiral, with the influx 
of high cost beneficiaries causing relatively low-cost beneficiaries to drop their coverage, thus 
driving up premiums for those remaining in the insurance pool (Courtemanche and Zapata, 
2014). This concern motivated another component of the ACA: the individual mandate. 
Beginning in 2014, individuals deemed to be able to afford coverage but electing to remain 
uncovered were penalized. The largest penalty that could be imposed was the maximum of either 
the total annual premium for the national average price of a Bronze exchange plan or $285 
2 
 
($975) in 2014 (2015).1 In addition, an employer mandate, which required employers with 100 of 
more full-time equivalent employees to offer “affordable” coverage to at least 95 percent of their 
full-time employees and their dependents (children up to age 26) or face a penalty, took effect in 
2015 (Tolbert, 2015).    
The remaining challenge associated with promoting universal coverage, affordability, 
was addressed by the ACA in 2014 in two ways. First, sliding scale subsidies in the form of 
premium tax credits (PTC) became available to consumers in every state with incomes between 
100 and 400 percent of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL) who did not qualify for other affordable 
coverage. Second, in states that opted to expand Medicaid via the ACA, anyone with income 
below 138 percent FPL became eligible for Medicaid coverage. Previously, Medicaid eligibility 
was typically restricted to those with low income among specific groups, such as children, single 
parents, pregnant women, the disabled, and the elderly. According to the Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 27 states participated in the Medicaid expansion in 2014, with three more 
implementing it in 2015 and another two in 2016.2 
Theoretically, the expansion of insurance coverage brought about by the ACA should 
increase access to care because of the reduction in out-of-pocket prices, but this is not 
automatically the case. On the demand side, newly insured individuals may not have sufficient 
knowledge of the health care system to easily secure a regular primary care doctor. Somers and 
Mahadevan (2010) report that only 12 percent of adults have proficient health literacy. On the 
supply side, concerns have been raised about whether or not there are sufficient numbers of 
primary care physicians to treat all of these newly insured patients (Schwartz, 2012; Glied and 
                                                          
1 The maximum increased to $2,085 in 2016. For more information, see: https://www.healthcare.gov/fees/fee-for-
not-being-covered/  
2 See the following website for further information: http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-
expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-
act/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D 
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Ma, 2015). While the federal government increased Medicaid primary care reimbursement rates 
to Medicare levels in 2013 and 2014, only a few fully maintained this “fee bump” in 2015.3  
Insurance coverage could influence risky health behaviors – such as smoking, drinking, 
and overeating – in either direction (Cawley and Ruhm, 2012). On one hand, improved access to 
care could translate to improvements in health behaviors via information, accountability, or 
treatments such as smoking cessation drugs or weight loss programs. On the other hand, 
insurance can theoretically worsen health outcomes through ex ante moral hazard, as the 
reduction in financial risks associated with unhealthy behaviors incentivizes such behaviors. 
Moreover, income effects from gaining free or subsidized coverage could influence behaviors by 
enabling consumers to spend money they had budgeted for direct purchase of health care on 
alcohol, cigarettes, and junk food or, conversely, on healthy food and gym memberships (Simon 
et al., 2017). 
The net effect of insurance on health depends on the changes in both access to care and 
health behaviors and therefore is also theoretically ambiguous. The extent to which insurance-
induced increases in health care utilization translate to better health depend on one’s initial 
location along the health production function. Evidence suggests that “flat of the curve” care – 
perhaps due to uncertainty over treatment effectiveness, the principal-agent nature of the patient-
doctor relationship, fee-for-service reimbursement, lack of coordination across health care 
providers, or malpractice liability – is common in the U.S. (Garber and Skinner, 2008). 
Moreover, the same issues with health literacy that could hamper efforts by the newly insured to 
                                                          
3 For more on state plans with respect to Medicaid primary care reimbursement see: 
http://kff.org/medicaid/perspective/the-aca-primary-care-increase-state-plans-for-sfy-2015/?elq_cid=1679210 and 
https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2015/04/23/states-to-continue-medicaid-pay-bump. 
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find a primary care doctor could also limit their ability to understand and comply with treatment 
recommendations.4  
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the impact of the ACA’s 2014 provisions on a 
variety of outcomes related to health care access, risky health behaviors, and self-assessed health. 
In addition to estimating the overall effect of the ACA on these outcomes, we also examine 
differential impacts resulting from state heterogeneity with respect to the choice to expand 
Medicaid via the ACA.  
We separately identify the effects of the private and Medicaid expansion portions of the 
ACA by using an identification strategy developed in Courtemanche et al. (2017) to estimate the 
impact of the ACA on insurance coverage by exploiting differences across local areas in pre-
treatment uninsured rates. To be more specific, we estimate a difference-in-difference-in-
differences (DDD) model with the differences coming from time, state Medicaid expansion 
status, and local area pre-treatment uninsured rate. If our objective was merely to isolate the 
effect of the Medicaid expansion, this could potentially be achieved with a simpler difference-in-
differences model comparing changes in states that expanded Medicaid to changes in non-
expansion states. However, identifying the impact of the other components of the ACA (e.g. 
mandates, subsidies, marketplaces) is more difficult due to their national nature. We therefore 
exploit an additional layer of plausibly exogenous variation arising from the fact that universal 
coverage initiatives provide the most intense treatments in areas with high uninsured rates.5  
Our data come from the 2011-2015 waves of the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System (BRFSS), with the sample restricted to non-elderly adults. The BRFSS is well suited for 
                                                          
4 Previous literature has shown a relationship between health literacy and health outcomes including health status, 
chronic illnesses, and hospitalizations (Cho et al., 2008; Berkman et al., 2011). 
5 Finkelstein (2007) uses a similar strategy to identify the impacts of another national program – Medicare – on 
health care spending. Miller (2012a) also uses this approach to estimate the impact of the Massachusetts reform on 
emergency room utilization without control states. 
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our study for three reasons. First, it includes a wide range of questions on health care access and 
self-assessed health. Second, with over 300,000 observations per year it is large enough to 
precisely estimate the effects of state-level interventions. Third, it was among the first large-scale 
health datasets to release data from 2015, allowing us to examine two calendar years of data after 
the full implementation of the ACA. 
Our results suggest that the ACA substantially improved access to health care among 
non-elderly adults. Gains in insurance coverage were 8.3 percentage points in Medicaid 
expansion states compared to 5.3 percentage points in non-expansion states, while reductions in 
cost being a barrier to care were 5.1 percentage points in expansion states and 2.6 percentage 
points in non-expansion states. The ACA also increased the probabilities of having a primary 
care doctor and a checkup by 3.0 and 2.4 percentage points, respectively, in non-Medicaid-
expansion states, with the effects not being statistically different in expansion states. Gains in 
access were generally largest among individuals with lower incomes and education levels. 
However, the effects of the ACA on risky health behaviors and self-assessed health were 
less pronounced – at least after two years. For the full sample, we observe no statistically 
significant impacts on any of the risky behavior or health outcomes in either Medicaid expansion 
or non-expansion states. We do, however, find some evidence that the ACA improved self-
assessed health among older non-elderly adults, particularly in expansion states.  
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section we review the literature on the impacts of expansions of insurance 
coverage. We divide the literature into studies focusing on coverage expansions prior to 2014 
and those that examine the components of the ACA implemented in 2014. 
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Effects of Pre-2014 Insurance Interventions 
There is an extensive literature spanning several decades examining the impact of the 
receipt of both public and private health insurance on a variety of outcomes, including access to 
care, utilization, spending, risky health behaviors, and health outcomes. Additional outcomes 
considered in this literature include labor market participation, job lock, and other public 
program participation. Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) provides a thorough review of the health 
insurance literature, while Buchmueller et al. (2015) reviews the literature on Medicaid and 
Gruber (2000) reviews the literature on health insurance and the labor market. Here we provide a 
brief summary of the evidence on the effects of insurance-related interventions on outcomes 
related to access, risky behaviors, and health. 
Causally interpretable evidence on the impacts of health insurance coverage dates back to 
the RAND Health Insurance Experiment of the 1970s-1980s, which randomly assigned 
individuals to insurance plans with different coinsurance rates and deductibles. Those assigned to 
a plan with no cost-sharing incurred about 20 percent higher medical expenses than others 
(Manning et al., 1987). However, on average this additional utilization did not translate to 
statistically significant effects on self-assessed health, smoking, or weight (Brook et al., 1983).  
A substantial portion of the literature focuses on expansions of the Medicaid program. 
Evidence suggests that expansions for children and pregnant women in the 1980s and 1990s 
reduced low birthweight (Currie and Gruber, 1996a), infant mortality (Currie and Gruber, 
1996b), and avoidable hospitalizations among children (Dafny and Gruber, 2005). However, 
other studies suggest that these expansions increased smoking among pregnant women (Dave et 
al., 2015) and had inconsistent effects on their health care utilization (Epstein and Newhouse, 
1998). Research has also found that Medicaid expansions for childless adults in the early 2000s 
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increased self-reported access to care and health while reducing mortality, particularly related to 
HIV (Sommers et al., 2012; Sommers, forthcoming). Studies of the randomized 2008 Oregon 
Medicaid lottery found that Medicaid increased health care access and utilization along a broad 
range of dimensions and led to large, immediate gains in self-assessed health (Finkelstein et al., 
2012; Taubman et al., 2014). However, no evidence was found of changes in smoking, obesity, 
or clinical indicators of physical health (Baicker et al., 2013; Finkelstein et al., 2012). Tello-
Trillo (2016) shows that a large Medicaid disenrollment in Tennessee reduced access to care and 
self-assessed health.  
Another branch of the literature studies the impacts of Medicare, the universal coverage 
program for U.S. seniors. Evidence shows that health care utilization increases sharply at the age 
of eligibility (Lichtenberg, 2002; Card et al., 2008), while mortality among patients admitted to 
the ER falls sharply (Card et al., 2009). However, other studies suggest that Medicare does not 
impact mortality more generally (Finkelstein and McKnight, 2008) and slightly worsens smoking 
and drinking habits (Dave and Kaestner, 2009).  
Several studies have focused on the 2006 Massachusetts health care reform, a universal 
coverage initiative that featured a combination of insurance market reforms, mandates, and 
subsidies similar to the ACA. Kolstad and Kowalski (2012), Miller (2012a), Miller (2012b), and 
Van der Wees et al. (2013) all present evidence consistent with the reform improving access to 
primary care. Van der Wees et al. (2013) and Courtmanche and Zapata (2014) find that the 
reform also improved adults’ self-assessed health, though an earlier study by Yelowitz and 
Cannon (2010) did not observe a statistically significant result. Courtemanche and Zapata (2014) 
also estimate that the reform reduced body mass index (BMI). Sommers et al. (2014) present 
evidence that the reform reduced mortality rates, though Kaestner (2015) disputes this finding. 
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Finally, another series of papers investigates the effects of the first major insurance 
expansion to occur under the ACA: a mandate for insurers to cover dependents up to 26 years 
old that took effect in 2010. Evidence suggests that this dependent coverage expansion increased 
access to care (Sommers et al., 2013; Barbaresco et al., 2015) and general health care utilization 
(Chua and Sommers, 2014; Akosa Antwi et al., 2015) but not utilization of preventive services 
(Barbaresco et al., 2015). Chua and Sommers (2014), Barbaresco et al. (2015) and Burns and 
Wolfe (2016) present evidence that the dependent coverage provision improved self-assessed 
health along some dimensions. Finally, Barbaresco et al. (2015) document a reduction in BMI. 
To summarize, the evidence from these pre-2014 interventions suggests that health 
insurance can impact access to care, risky behaviors, and health outcomes but that the effects 
often vary substantially across contexts. For instance, the effects of insurance on self-assessed 
health appear to have been large and immediate in the cases of the Oregon Medicaid expansion 
and Massachusetts reform but more modest after the ACA dependent coverage expansion and 
virtually nonexistent in the RAND experiment. As another example, only the Massachusetts 
reform and dependent coverage provision appear to have led to weight loss. This underscores the 
necessity of obtaining credible evidence on the effects of the 2014 components of the ACA 
rather than simply relying on results from other settings.  
In particular, even evidence from the prior interventions that have the most in common 
with the ACA – Medicaid and the Massachusetts reform – may not be reliable indicators. In 
contrast to the narrower population targeted by Medicaid expansions, the ACA expanded 
coverage to a much broader range of low and middle income families and childless adults, with 
only part of the expansion occurring via Medicaid. Marketplace plans differ from traditional 
Medicaid in terms of cost-sharing and provider networks. The effects of the Massachusetts 
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reform and ACA could differ because of the relatively low pre-reform uninsured rate in 
Massachusetts, differences in the socio-demographic characteristics of those gaining coverage, 
the relative public enthusiasm surrounding the Massachusetts law compared to the ACA, and the 
fact that the entire expansion among adults was done though subsidized private coverage in 
Massachusetts as opposed to the mix of public and private used by the ACA (Gruber, 2008).  
Effects of the 2014 Components of the ACA 
Much of the early evidence on the effects of the 2014 components of the ACA focuses on 
changes in coverage. At the national level, simple pre-post comparisons find increases in 
coverage of between 2.8 and 6.9 percentage points, depending on the time frame, dataset, and 
population group (Long et al., 2014; Smith and Medalia, 2015; Courtemanche et al., 2016; 
Obama, 2016; Barnett and Vornovitsky, 2016; McMorrow et al., 2016).6 Other recent work uses 
more sophisticated econometric techniques to isolate the impact of different components of the 
ACA on coverage. Kaestner et al. (2015) and Wherry and Miller (2016) focus on the Medicaid 
expansions, while Frean et al. (2016) focus on the Medicaid expansions, subsidized premiums 
for Marketplace coverage, and the individual mandate. Using the identification strategy that we 
employ in this paper, Courtemanche et al. (2017) aim to estimate the impact of the ACA more 
generally, finding that it increased coverage by an average of 5.9 percentage points in Medicaid 
expansion states compared to 2.8 percentage points in non-expansion states in 2014. 
A growing number of studies examine health-related outcomes besides insurance. 
Shartzer et al. (2015), Polsky et al. (2015), Kirby and Vistnes (2016), Sommers et al. (2015), and 
Sommers and Blendon et al. (2016) show that the timing of the ACA coincided with increased 
access to care, while Sommers et al. (2015) also document an improvement in self-assessed 
                                                          
6 Although we focus our discussion on national studies, single-state investigations generally reach similar 
conclusions (Sommers et al., 2014, Sommers and Chua et al., 2016, Golberstein et al., 2015; Benitez et al., 2016). 
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health. However, it is unclear whether estimates based only on time-series variation are able to 
disentangle causal effects of the ACA from other national shocks. Three papers use difference-
in-differences (DD) approaches to examine the impacts of the 2014 ACA Medicaid expansion on 
access, health behaviors, or self-assessed health after two years.7 Using data from the Gallup-
Healthways Well-Being Index, Sommers et al. (2015) find evidence that the Medicaid expansion 
improved access along some dimensions but did not significantly affect self-assessed health. 
Abramowitz (2016) finds that the Medicaid expansion was associated with a reduction in self-
reported overall health using data from the Current Population Survey Annual Social and 
Economic Supplement. Simon et al. (2017) use data from the BRFSS and find that the Medicaid 
expansion increased some aspects of access and preventive care use among low-income childless 
adults. However, they find no evidence of effects on risky health behaviors or most of their self-
assessed health measures. 
Relative to these previous studies, our main contribution is to present causally 
interpretable evidence on the effects of the full ACA – as opposed to just its Medicaid portion – 
on access to health care, risky health behaviors, and self-assessed health. This is critical 
information in light of ongoing policy debates about the future of the ACA. While we adopt the 
DDD strategy of Courtemanche el al. (2017), our work is distinct because we examine outcomes 
beyond just insurance coverage, use a second year of post-treatment data, and use a different 
dataset (BRFSS instead of the American Community Survey).  
A secondary contribution of our work is to offer an alternative identification strategy for 
the impact of the Medicaid expansion that relies on weaker assumptions than the DD approach 
used previously. Specifically, we do not need to assume that any differential changes in the 
                                                          
7 Additionally, Sommers et al. (2012) find that early Medicaid expansions under the ACA in New York, Maine, and 
Arizona were associated with increases in access to care and self-assessed health. 
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outcomes between the expansion and non-expansion states in 2014 are attributable to Medicaid. 
Instead, our approach allows for other factors (e.g. underlying trends or enthusiasm for the other 
parts of the ACA) to contribute to this differential as long as they are not correlated with pre-
treatment uninsured rates.  
 
III. DATA 
Our primary data source is the BRFSS, an annual telephone survey conducted by state 
health departments and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention that collects data on 
preventive services, risky behaviors, and self-assessed health for all 50 states and the District of 
Columbia. A random digit dialing method is used to select a representative sample of 
respondents from the non-institutionalized adult population. The BRFSS is appealing for our 
study because its large number of observations, over 300,000 per year, allows us to precisely 
estimate the effects of the treatment expansions. This is important since only a fraction of the 
population is affected by the change in legislation, limiting plausible effect sizes. 
 Our main sample consists of 19-64 year olds from the 2011-2015 waves. We exclude 
individuals older than 64 since the ACA was not intended to affect the health care coverage of 
seniors. We begin the sample in 2011 because that was the first year in which the BRFSS 
included cell phones in their sampling. Since individuals who exclusively use cell phones are 
disproportionately young, this results in a discrete change in the sample means of many of our 
key variables (including insurance coverage) between 2010 and 2011. An additional benefit of 
excluding years prior to 2011 is that this limits the sample to years after the implementation of 
the ACA’s dependent coverage expansion, preventing confounding from differences in state 
dependent coverage mandates prior to the ACA.  
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 We utilize fourteen different health-related dependent variables.8 The first four relate to 
health care access: dummy variables reflecting whether the respondent has any health insurance, 
had any medical care needed but not obtained because of cost in the previous year, has a primary 
care physician, and had a well-patient doctor check-up visit (e.g. physical) in the previous year. 
The next three outcomes related to risky health behaviors: dummies for whether one smokes, 
alcoholic drinks consumed per month, and a continuous variable measuring the respondents’ 
body weight in the form of BMI.9 Another set of outcomes relates to self-assessed health status: 
a dummy for whether overall health is good or better, a dummy for whether overall health is very 
good or better, a dummy for whether overall health is excellent, and days of the last 30 not in 
good mental health, not in good physical health, and with health-related functional limitations. 
Self-assessed health variables, though subjective, have been shown to be correlated with 
objective measures of health (e.g. Idler and Benyamini, 1997; DeSalvo et al., 2006; Phillips et 
al., 2010). While one might initially be skeptical that insurance expansions could meaningfully 
affect health in their first two years, prior evidence from the randomized Oregon Medicaid 
experiment (Finketstein et al., 2012) and the Massachusetts universal coverage initiative 
(Courtemanche and Zapata, 2014; Van der Wees et al., 2013) have shown that immediate gains 
in self-assessed health can indeed occur. 
Our last outcome variable is a summary index of health that incorporates the three health 
behaviors, the overall self-assessed health index, and the three self-assessments that pertain to 
                                                          
8 Note that we do not utilize the screening (e.g. colonoscopy, mammogram, pap test) variables available in the 
BRFSS because, in almost all states, they are only available in 2012 and 2014. This means that 2014 would be the 
only post-treatment year, which would be especially problematic since the questions use reflection periods of a year 
or greater (e.g. pap test in past year). In other words, it is not clear that 2014 would be a true “post-treatment” year 
for these outcomes, since part of the reflection period for respondents surveyed in that year would occur prior to the 
ACA taking effect.   
9 Results are robust to using an indicator for obesity (BMI ≥ 30) rather than continuous BMI. Self-reports of weight 
and height are well-known to suffer from measurement error, but studies implementing a correction method 
involving validation data from the NHANES have repeatedly shown that adjusting for this error does not affect the 
signs and significance of coefficient estimates (e.g. Cawley, 2004; Courtemanche et al., 2015). 
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physical/mental health and functional limitations. We follow Chetty et al. (2011) and Yelowitz 
(forthcoming) by first transforming each variable so that a higher value represents a more 
desirable outcome. We then standardize each of the seven variables by subtracting the mean and 
dividing by its standard deviation. Finally, we sum all seven variables and divide by the standard 
deviation of the sum to arrive at the final index with a standard deviation of one. 
 We include a wide range of control variables. The controls from the BRFSS are dummy 
variables for age groups (5-year increments from 25-29 to 60-64, with 19-24 as the reference 
group), gender, race/ethnicity (non-Hispanic black, Hispanic, and non-Hispanic white with other 
as the reference group), marital status, education (high school degree, some college, and college 
graduate with less than a high school degree as the reference group), household income category 
($10,000-$15,000, $15,000-$20,000, $20,000-$25,000, $25,000-$35,000, $35,000-$50,000, 
$50,000-$75,000, and >$75,000, with <$10,000 as the reference group), number of children in 
the household (zero to four with five or more as the reference group), whether the respondent 
reports her primary occupation as student, and whether the respondent is unemployed. We also 
control for the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ seasonally adjusted monthly state unemployment rate 
as well as dummy variables for whether states set up their own insurance exchanges and whether 
these exchanges experienced glitches (KFF, 2014; Kowalski, 2014). 
A critical variable for our identification strategy is the uninsured rate in the respondent’s 
“local area” in the pre-treatment year of 2013.  The BRFSS does not contain county level 
identifiers continuously throughout our period of analysis, making it impossible for us to 
compute county level uninsured rates during the pre-treatment periods. Instead, we use 
information collected on type of location within a state. The BRFSS reports whether the 
respondents reside in the center city of an MSA, outside the center city of an MSA but inside the 
14 
 
county containing the center city, inside a suburban county of the MSA, or not in an MSA. 
However, no location information was collected from cell-phone respondents. We use this 
location variable to construct four sub-groups within each state: within a central city, suburbs, 
non-MSA, and location unavailable (i.e. cell phone sample). Based on these within-state 
classifications we calculate the pre-treatment average uninsured rates by location (considering 
“cell phone” to be a location for the sake of convenience) within a state. In order to ensure that 
each area contains a sufficient number of respondents to reliably compute pre-treatment 
uninsured rates, we combine the seven areas with fewer than 200 respondents in 2013 with other 
areas.10 After doing this, there are 194 areas with 2013 uninsured rates computed from between 
219 and 5,804 respondents, with the average being 1,475 and the median being 1,205.  
Our Medicaid expansion variable comes from the Kaiser Family Foundation, a non-profit 
organization that collects a vast array of health policy information. This information includes 
whether a state implemented the Medicaid expansion as well as whether this expansion was done 
through private insurance via a Section 1115 waiver. Expanding under the Section 115 waiver, as 
done by Arkansas, Iowa, and Michigan, introduced cost sharing and premiums for enrollees and 
could therefore have had different effects than expanding via traditional Medicaid. We attempted 
to test for such differences but statistical power was insufficient to draw meaningful conclusions; 
we therefore simply classify the Section 1115 waiver states as being Medicaid expanders. Thus a 
total of 27 states (including the District of Columbia) participated in the 2014 Medicaid 
expansion and 30 states (including the District of Columbia) expanded by the end of 2015. 
In our main specifications, we simply classify the 30 states that expanded Medicaid by 
2015 as the treatment group for the Medicaid expansion and the other 21 as the control group. 
                                                          
10 Specifically, we combine the central city and suburban parts of Wyoming into one area, and the same for 
Vermont, South Dakota, and Montana. We also combine the suburban and rural parts of Massachusetts, Arizona, 
and California. 
15 
 
The majority of the expansion states implemented their expansion in January 2014, with some 
exceptions. Michigan’s expansion took effect in April 2014 and New Hampshire’s in August 
2014. In 2015, Indiana and Alaska expanded Medicaid in February and September, respectively. 
States are classified as part of the treatment group beginning the month of their expansion. 
Table 1 provides pre-treatment means and standard deviations of the dependent variables, 
while Online Appendix Table A1 does the same for the controls. We also report the summary 
statistics stratified into four groups based on whether the respondent’s state expanded Medicaid 
and whether her local area’s pre-treatment uninsured rate was above or below the median for 
individuals in the sample. According to Table 1, 79 percent of the sample had insurance at 
baseline. For both the high- and low-uninsured rate subgroups, individuals in Medicaid 
expansion states were slightly more likely to have insurance prior to 2014 than those in non-
expansion states. Residents of Medicaid expansion states and states with pre-ACA uninsured 
rates below the median (column 3) had, on average, better health care access and self-assessed 
health than their counterparts even before the ACA was implemented. They were also more 
educated, more likely to be employed, and had higher incomes.   
Our econometric design will account for these baseline differences, but will rely on the 
assumption of common counterfactual trends in the outcomes on the bases of Medicaid 
expansion status and pre-treatment uninsured rates. Figures 1 and 2 show that the pre-ACA 
trends are generally similar along these dimensions for most outcomes. Later, we will test the 
common trends assumption more formally through an event study analysis. 
 
IV. ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
For each outcome, our econometric objectives are to estimate the effects of both the fully 
implemented ACA (including the Medicaid expansion) and the ACA without the Medicaid 
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expansion. A major challenge in doing so is to disentangle the impacts of the nationwide 
components of the ACA (e.g. exchanges, mandates, subsidies) from underlying year-to-year 
fluctuations that would have occurred even in the law’s absence. We adopt the DDD strategy 
Courtemanche et al. (2017) used to identify the impact of the ACA on health insurance coverage, 
which exploits variation across space in the intensity of treatment arising from differential pre-
treatment uninsured rates. Adding this layer of geographic variation allows us to include time 
period fixed effects while still identifying the effects of the national (private) portion of the law.  
Assuming that the extent of a geographic area’s treatment is proportional to its baseline 
uninsured rate, the DDD model is  
𝑦𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1(𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡) + 𝛾2(𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡) + 𝛾3(𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 ∗
𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡) + 𝜸𝟒𝑿𝒊𝒂𝒔𝒕 + 𝜃𝑎𝑡 + 𝛼𝑎𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑡                            (1) 
 
where 
 𝑦𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑡 is the outcome for individual i in area type (central city, rest of MSA, non-MSA, 
cell phone) a in state s in time period (month/year) t, 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 is an indicator for whether period t is in the post-treatment period of January 2014 
or later,  
 𝑿𝒊𝒔𝒕 is a vector of control variables, 
 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠 is an indicator for whether state s participated in the ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion,  
 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 is the pre-treatment (2013) uninsured rate in area type a within state s, 
 𝜃𝑎𝑡 represents time fixed effects for each month/year*area type combination (e.g. central 
city in January 2011); these not only control for time as flexibly as possible but also 
allow time trends to evolve differentially across individuals living in central city, 
suburban, and rural areas as well as those with only cell phones, and 
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 𝛼𝑎𝑠 represents fixed effects for each geographic area (e.g. central city in Alabama).  
Note that 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 is not included in the model since it is captured by the time fixed effects, while 
the terms 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 ∗ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠 are not separately included since they are captured by 
the area fixed effects.  
 In (1), the effect of the ACA without the Medicaid expansion is given by 
𝛾1*𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠, which means it is assumed to be 0 in a (hypothetical) area with a 0 percent 
uninsured rate at baseline and to increase linearly as the pre-ACA uninsured rate rises. (We have 
also experimented with non-linear functional forms for the uninsured rate and found that they do 
not reveal any meaningful new information.) The identifying assumption is that, in the absence 
of the treatment, any changes in the outcomes that would have occurred in 2014-2015 would not 
have varied differentially by area uninsured rates, conditional on the controls. We do not need to 
assume that there would have been no changes at all in the outcomes without the ACA 
(conditional on the controls), as would be the case in a pre-post comparison that did not utilize 
the variation in pre-treatment uninsured rates.    
 The effect of the Medicaid expansion is given by 𝛾3 ∗ 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠. As with the other 
components of the ACA, the impact of the Medicaid expansion is now assumed to vary linearly 
with the state’s baseline uninsured rate. (Again, we found that considering non-linear functional 
forms did not reveal new information.) Since the Medicaid expansion should not causally affect 
insurance coverage in an area with a 0 percent baseline uninsured rate, we consider 𝛾2 to reflect  
unobserved confounders rather than capturing part of the expansion’s causal effect. This 
interpretation follows Miller (2012a) and Courtemanche et al. (2017). The identifying 
assumption for the impact of the Medicaid expansion is therefore that, without the ACA, 
differential changes in the outcomes in 2014-2015 between Medicaid expansion and non-
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expansion states would not have been correlated with 2013 uninsured rates. This is a weaker 
assumption than would be required by a DD model, in which case one would have to assume 
that, conditional on the controls, there would have been no differential changes across expansion 
and non-expansion states. 
Robustness Checks 
 We also conduct a number of robustness checks. The first several vary the set of control 
variables to address the possible concern that some of them could be endogenous to the ACA. 
Recall that the baseline model includes demographic (age, gender, and race/ethnicity), family 
(education, marital status, and number of children), economic (income, employment and student 
status, and unemployment rate), and health insurance exchange (interactions of year = 2014 with 
whether the state set up its own exchange and whether the exchange had glitches) controls. The 
first four robustness checks include only subsets of these variables: demographic controls only, 
demographic and family controls, demographic and economic controls, and demographic and 
exchange controls.  
Next, recall that we do not know geographic area type (central city, suburbs, or rural) for 
individuals interviewed on a cell phone, necessitating our combining of all such individuals into 
a separate group within each state. The next robustness check aims to ensure that this decision 
does not meaningfully influence the results by dropping those interviewed on cell phones, 
ensuring the availability of the area type variable for everyone in the sample. 
 The following set of robustness checks addresses the potential concern that interacting 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 and 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 with the same uninsured rate variable may be problematic 
since the Medicaid and private portions of the ACA applied to different income ranges (under 
138 percent of the FPL for Medicaid, above 138 percent in Medicaid expansion states and above 
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100 percent in non-expansion states for the exchanges/subsidies). The first such check interacts 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 with the pre-ACA uninsured rate for respondents above 100 percent of the FPL and 
𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 with the rate for those below 138 percent. Additional specifications use a 
100 percent cutoff for both groups and a 138 percent cutoff for both groups.  
Next, we consider alternative approaches to computing pre-treatment uninsured rates that 
utilize a larger number of individuals per area than our baseline strategy. This addresses possible 
concerns about using groups narrower than state to construct this key variable. First, we pool all 
three pre-treatment years when computing baseline uninsured rates rather than just using 2013 in 
order to increase the number of individuals in each area. Second, we drop the sub-state 
classifications and simply compute pre-treatment uninsured rates at the state level (using just 
2013).  
In another robustness check, we drop 19-25 year olds. Since this age group was treated 
by the 2010 ACA dependent coverage provision, their treatment status is somewhat ambiguous. 
With that said, Courtemanche et al. (2017) found that this age group still experienced large 
coverage gains in response to the 2014 ACA provisions, so we do not expect dropping 19-25 
year olds to meaningfully impact our results. 
The remaining robustness checks deal with the potentially ambiguous Medicaid 
expansion treatment status of some states. Many states partially expanded Medicaid under the 
ACA prior to 2014. Courtemanche et al. (2017) did not find meaningful differences in coverage 
gains between early expanders and states that did not expand at all until 2014, and Frean et al. 
(2016) find that many of the people who became eligible for Medicaid under the early 
expansions actually did not take up coverage until 2014. We therefore do not expect that 
including early expansion states as part of the treatment group will meaningfully impact the 
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results, but we consider alternative classifications to verify. One such approach restricts the 
sample to only the nine treatment states and twenty control states that did not have some form of 
Medicaid expansion prior to January 2014, as classified by Kaestner et al. (2015). Another uses 
the same nine treatment states but the full control group. Next, we only exclude the five states 
that Kaestner et al. (2015) describe as having comprehensive early Medicaid expansions prior to 
2014. Our final robustness check drops the states that expanded Medicaid in 2014 or 2015 but 
whose expansion was not effective as of January 1, 2014.  
 
V. RESULTS 
Tables 2 and 3 report the results from the baseline DDD regression for each outcome. 
The top panel presents the coefficient estimates and standard errors for the variables of interest, 
while the bottom panel gives the implied effects of the ACA at the average pre-treatment 
uninsured rate. Indicators of statistical significance at the 0.1 percent, 1 percent, and 5 percent 
level are also shown. 
We begin our discussion with the outcomes related to access – insurance coverage, 
having a primary care doctor, cost being a barrier to care in the past 12 months, and checkup in 
the past 12 months – which are in the first four columns of Table 2. Because the cost barrier and 
checkup variables reflect information from the past 12 months, treatment status in 2014 is 
ambiguous for these outcomes. For instance, for someone interviewed in March 2014, only three 
of the twelve months that determine one’s answer to these questions are actually in the post-
treatment period. We therefore drop 2014 in the regressions for these outcomes, explaining their 
smaller sample size.     
The results suggest that the private portion of the ACA increased access to care along all 
observable dimensions. Specifically, at the average pre-treatment uninsured rate it increased the 
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probabilities of having insurance coverage, a primary care doctor, and a well-patient checkup by 
5.3, 3.0, and 2.4 percentage points, respectively, while reducing the probability of cost being a 
barrier to care by 2.6 percentage points. The ACA therefore led to sizeable improvements in 
access even in states that did not expand Medicaid. 
The Medicaid expansion led to additional gains in access along some dimensions. At the 
average pre-treatment uninsured rate, it increased insurance coverage by a statistically significant 
3.1 percentage points and reduced the probability of reporting cost being a barrier to care by 2.5 
percentage points. We do not find significant effects on having a primary care doctor or a well-
patient checkup, though the magnitude for checkup is an economically meaningful 1.2 
percentage points – around two-fifths as large as the effect on insurance.11 Broadly speaking, our 
finding that the Medicaid expansion increased access along some but not all dimensions is 
consistent with the results from the DD studies by Sommers et al. (2015) and Simon et al. 
(2017).12 
Combining the effects of the private and Medicaid components shows that the fully 
implemented ACA led to large gains in all access measures. Insurance coverage increased by 8.3 
                                                          
11 Both the access variables for which we did not find statistically significant effects of the Medicaid expansion 
relate to primary care. One possible explanation is that newly enrolled Medicaid recipients may still have trouble 
accessing primary care, perhaps due to the temporary nature of the ACA Medicaid fee bump (MACPAC, 2015) 
leading to a smaller than expected change in physician Medicaid participation and / or some degree of access crowd-
out due to the concurrent expansion of private (i.e. Marketplace) coverage. However, since the magnitude of the 
estimated effect on checkups is meaningfully large despite its statistical insignificance, we are reluctant to strongly 
push this explanation. 
12 The only noteworthy differences for specific access outcomes are that we find evidence of an effect on cost being 
a barrier to care but not having a primary care doctor, whereas the reverse is true for Sommers et al. (2015) and 
Simon et al. (2017). In our view, the difference in results for cost being a barrier to care is not a major discrepancy, 
as Sommers et al. (2015) and Simon et al. (2017) find the same signs and magnitudes that are only slightly smaller 
than ours – their estimates just do not quite reach statistical significance. The discrepancy in results for primary care 
doctor is more substantial, as our point estimate is essentially zero. In unreported regressions (available upon 
request), we replicated Simon et al.'s DD model and restriction of the sample to those with incomes below 100 
percent FPL. We found that the estimated increase in probability of having a primary care doctor shrinks roughly in 
half (from about 4 to 2 percentage points) and becomes slightly statistically insignificant if we add the control for 
the state setting up its own exchange. This suggests some upward bias in the DD estimate due to unobserved 
differences in state attitudes toward the ACA, which we control for with our DDD approach.      
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percentage points, probability of having a primary care doctor rose by 3.1 percentage points, 
probability of cost being a barrier to care fell by 5.1 percentage points, and probability of having 
a checkup rose by 3.6 percentage points. Based on the pre-treatment sample means reported in 
Table 2, these results imply that the full ACA reduced the uninsured rate by 44 percent while 
also reducing the number of people without a primary care doctor by 12 percent, those with 
foregone care because of cost by 28 percent, and those not having an annual checkup by 10 
percent.  
The remaining three columns of Table 2 report the results for the three health behavior 
variables: BMI, probability of being a smoker, and drinks per month. We observe no statistically 
significant effects of the private portion, Medicaid expansion, or overall ACA on any of these 
outcomes. Moreover, the magnitudes are relatively small compared to those for the access 
outcomes: the estimated effects of the full ACA at the mean pre-treatment uninsured rate on 
BMI, smoking, and drinking are just 0.1 percent, 5.3 percent, and 1.8 percent of the 
corresponding sample means. Finally, the signs are mixed, with the full ACA reducing BMI and 
drinking, but increasing smoking. For these reasons, we suspect that these null results are more 
likely to represent “true zeros” than simply a lack of statistical power. Our findings for the 
Medicaid expansion are consistent with the null effects on risky behaviors found by Simon et al. 
(2017) using DD methods and a sample of only low-income adults. 
 Table 3 displays the results for the self-assessed health outcomes. We find no 
statistically significant effects of either the private or Medicaid components of the ACA on any 
of the outcomes. The implied effects of the full ACA represent just -0.4 percent, -0.4 percent, 2.5 
percent, 1.4 percent, -3.7 percent, and 4.2 percent of the pre-treatment means of good or better 
health, very good or better health, excellent health, days not in good physical health, days not in 
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good mental health, and days with health-related limitations, respectively. These relatively small 
magnitudes, combined with the inconsistent pattern of signs, again increases our confidence that 
these null results reflect “true zeros.” Our small and insignificant estimates contrast the large, 
early improvements in these same self-assessed health outcomes seen after the Massachusetts 
health care reform (Courtemanche and Zapata, 2014; Van der Wees et al., 2013) and randomized 
Oregon Medicaid experiment (Finkelstein et al., 2012). However, our null results for the 
Medicaid expansion are consistent with the lack of clear improvements in self-assessed health 
found by the DD studies in the ACA Medicaid expansion literature (Sommers et al., 2015; 
Abramowitz, 2016; Simon et al., 2017). 
The reported results in Tables 2 and 3 only compute impacts of the ACA at the mean pre-
treatment uninsured rate of 20.2 percent. Because area pre-treatment uninsured rates varied 
widely, ranging from 3 to 36 percent with a standard deviation of 8 percent, this approach 
disguises a great deal of heterogeneity. Figure 3 therefore shows how the predicted changes in 
our access outcomes vary across this range of uninsured rates in both expansion and non-
expansion states. The effects on the health behavior and self-assessed health outcomes are never 
significant at any uninsured rate, so we do not present similar graphs for them.   
The predicted effect of the full ACA on the probability of having insurance coverage 
reached as high as 14.7 percentage points in the area with the highest pre-treatment uninsured 
rate. Without the Medicaid expansion, this impact only reached 9.3 percentage points. The 
predicted impact of the full ACA on the probability of having a primary care doctor extends to 
5.6 percentage points at the highest uninsured rate, with essentially no difference between 
Medicaid expansion and non-expansion states. For the cost barrier and well-patient checkup 
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outcomes, the maximum predicted effects of the ACA are 9 percentage points and 6.4 percentage 
points, respectively, in Medicaid expansion states and 4.5 and 4.3 in non-expansion states. 
Lastly, the results for the robustness checks are available in Appendix Tables A2-A15 
(one table for each outcome). In almost all cases, the findings from the baseline regressions 
persist across the various robustness checks. 
VI. INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES 
A natural question with interpretation of the reduced-form results from the preceding 
section is whether we can assume the extensive margin of insurance coverage is the only 
mechanism through which the ACA affected the other outcomes. If this is true, then it would be 
reasonable to estimate an instrumental variables (IV) specification in which 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 ∗
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 and 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 ∗ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 are instruments and insurance coverage is 
the endogenous variable.13 This assumption is difficult to test and may not hold if, for instance, 
areas with higher baseline uninsured rates also had higher rates of underinsurance (e.g. bare-
bones privately purchased policies), in which case the intensive margin of coverage quality is 
another mechanism through which our treatment variables could affect the other outcomes. 
Moreover, general equilibrium effects are possible; for instance, in areas with large numbers of 
newly insured residents, continuously covered individuals may face increased difficulty 
accessing providers, while those working in the health care industry may experience positive 
income shocks. For these reasons, we prefer to emphasize our reduced form approach as it 
allows for all of these mechanisms. Nonetheless, IV results can be informative about how large 
the effects of coverage on the outcomes would need to be for the extensive margin of coverage to 
be the only relevant mechanism.    
                                                          
13 We are not able to estimate an IV model with both private and Medicaid coverage as endogenous variables 
because the BRFSS does not contain information on source of coverage. 
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Results from the IV model – with the full set of controls and fixed effects included – are 
presented in Table 4. We only report the results for the health care access outcomes since those 
were the only ones where significant effects emerged in the reduced form regressions.14 In each 
column, we present the second-stage coefficient estimate for the health insurance variable along 
with its standard error, the first stage F-statistic from the test of joint significance of the two 
instruments, and the p-value for the overidentification test. In this case, the overidentification test 
essentially tests the null hypothesis that the estimated local average treatment effects of 
insurance would be statistically indistinguishable if either 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 or 
𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 ∗ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 were used as the sole instrument. A rejection of the null 
could therefore mean either that the effect of gaining coverage via the Medicaid expansion is 
different from the effect of gaining coverage through the private component of the ACA (in 
which case the IV specification captures a weighted average of these two effects), or that the 
Medicaid and private expansions activate other mechanisms besides simply the extensive margin 
of coverage (in which case the IV specification would be inappropriate).  
The results show that the estimated effects of insurance on the other access outcomes are 
large and highly significant. Specifically, insurance coverage increases the probability of having 
a primary care doctor by 45 percentage points and the probability of having a well-patient doctor 
visit by 36 percentage points, while decreasing the probability of having foregone care by 47 
percentage points. To provide a reference point, IV estimates from the Oregon Medicaid 
experiment show that Medicaid coverage increased similar access outcomes by between 20 and 
34 percentage points (Finkelstein et al., 2012). Therefore, even if our IV estimates are slightly 
                                                          
14 Not surprisingly, IV estimates for the health behavior and self-assessed health outcomes are highly insignificant. 
These results are available upon request. 
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overstated because of the presence of other possible mechanisms, the results still suggest a strong 
effect on access from the mix of private and public coverage induced by the ACA.  
  We find that our instruments generally perform well in the diagnostic tests. They 
generate first stage F-statistics that are more than an order of magnitude above the weak 
instrument threshold of 10. The overidentification test only rejects the null hypothesis for 
primary care doctor. This is not surprising given the very different reduced-form effects of the 
private and Medicaid components of the ACA on the probability of having a primary care doctor 
presented previously.   
 
VII. EVENT STUDY MODEL 
As discussed previously, a causal interpretation of our estimates depends on two key 
assumptions. First, conditional on the controls, changes in our outcomes in 2014-2015 would not 
have been correlated with pretreatment uninsured rates in the absence of the ACA. Second, 
differential changes in 2014-2015 between Medicaid expansion and non-expansion states would 
not have been correlated with pre-treatment uninsured rates. In this section, we indirectly assess 
the plausibility of these assumptions by estimating an event study model that includes the 
interactions of the treatment variables with the full set of year fixed effects, with 2013 being the 
base year. The model is 
𝑦𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1(𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 ∗ 𝑌2011𝑡) + 𝜃2(𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 ∗ 𝑌2012𝑡) + 
𝜃3(𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 ∗ 𝑌2014𝑡) + 𝜃4(𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 ∗ 𝑌2015𝑡) + 𝜃5(𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠 ∗ 𝑌2011𝑡)
+ 𝜃6(𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠 ∗ 𝑌2012𝑡) + 𝜃7(𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠 ∗ 𝑌2014𝑡) + 𝜃8(𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠
∗ 𝑌2015𝑡) + 𝜃9(𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 ∗ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠 ∗ 𝑌2011𝑡)
+ 𝜃10(𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 ∗ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠 ∗ 𝑌2012𝑡) + 𝜃11(𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠
∗ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠 ∗ 𝑌2014𝑡) + 𝜃12(𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑠 ∗ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠 ∗ 𝑌2015𝑡) 
+𝜽𝟏𝟑𝑿𝒊𝒂𝒔𝒕 + 𝛼𝑎𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑡                                       (3) 
where Y2011t, Y2012t, Y2014t, and Y2015t are indicators for whether year t is 2011, 2012, 2014, 
and 2015, respectively. The tests for differential pre-treatment trends (i.e., falsification tests) are 
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provided by evaluating whether the coefficients on the “treatment” variables in the pre-treatment 
years (θ1, θ2, θ9, θ10) are equal to 0.15 
Table 5 presents the event study results for the seven outcomes related to health care 
access and health behaviors and Table 6 presents similar results for the seven outcomes related to 
self-assessed health using the full set of controls. In each table, the top panel presents the 
coefficient estimates of interest. Between the two tables there are a total of 56 falsification tests 
(four parameters of interest in each of fourteen regressions) and only three significant results at 
the 5 percent level. Three out of 56 is 5.3 percent, which is essentially the same as would be 
expected by chance. These results therefore provide some reassurance about the validity of our 
model to estimate causal effects for the “true” ACA. 
Another advantage of the event study specification is that it allows us to distinguish 
between the effects of the ACA in 2014 and 2015. The most notable result is that the coverage 
gains from the ACA appear to have increased in the second year relative to the first year, with 
the increase coming entirely from the private portion. Specifically, in 2014 the fully 
implemented ACA increased the probability of a non-elderly adult being insured by 6.6 
percentage points, with 3.9 percentage points coming from the private portion and the remaining 
2.7 percentage points from Medicaid. These magnitudes are similar to those estimated by 
Courtemanche et al. (2017) using American Community Survey (ACS) data. In contrast, in 2015 
the coverage gain from the full ACA jumped to 10.3 percentage points, with 6.3 percentage 
points coming from the private component and 4 percentage points from Medicaid.16 
                                                          
15 Recall that the coefficient on the 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡  variable in our main regression was assumed to capture 
unobserved confounders rather than part of the causal effect of the Medicaid expansion. We therefore do not 
consider θ1 and θ2 to provide additional falsification tests. 
16 Our finding of additional coverage gains in 2015 is consistent with the Cohen et al. (2016) descriptive 
examination of changes over time in coverage using the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS). They report in 
their table 17 that among non-elderly adults, the increase in those reporting coverage of any type was 4.1 percentage 
points between 2013 and 2014 and 3.5 percentage points between 2014 and 2015. For public (private) coverage, 
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Accordingly, the gains in primary care access and reductions in cost barriers also increased in 
2015 relative to 2014, though these increases appear to have come entirely from the Medicaid 
expansion. The event study design also causes a few sporadic results to emerge for the health 
behavior and self-assessed health outcomes. In particular, the fully implemented ACA increased 
the probability of reporting excellent self-assessed health in 2015 (but not 2014) and reduced 
days in poor mental health in 2014 (but not 2015). These results, however, could simply be a 
byproduct of the large number of hypotheses tested by the event study models. 
 
VIII. SUBSAMPLE ANALYSES 
One possible explanation for the large number of null results, particularly for the 
Medicaid expansion, might be that the full sample includes various groups of people with 
different probabilities of being treated by the ACA. In this section, we examine whether more 
effects show up if we “zoom in” on the subpopulations most likely to experience larger gains in 
coverage (those with low-to-middle incomes and those with relatively low education levels) and 
/ or larger gains in health and related outcomes (older, but not yet elderly adults) as a result of the 
ACA. We do this by running subsample regressions for those below versus above the median 
household income, those without a college degree versus college graduates, and those below 
versus above the median age. Unfortunately, perhaps due to the demanding nature of the DDD 
specification and the need for each subsample to have sufficient numbers of individuals in each 
area to reliably compute pre-treatment uninsured rates, splitting the sample into three or more 
groups results in estimates that are too imprecise to be useful. This is also why we do not stratify 
by race/ethnicity: the sample sizes for minority groups such as blacks and Hispanics are not 
sufficient to obtain meaningfully precise results. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
their table 18 (19) suggests the increase was 1 (3.1) percentage points between 2013 and 2014 and 1.2 (2.4) 
percentage points between 2014 and 2015. 
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Tables 7-12 report the results. Tables 7 and 8 stratify the sample by income. It is 
reassuring that the sizable gains in access were concentrated in the below-median-income 
subsample. The increase in insurance coverage from the full ACA was 11.9 percentage points for 
the lower income group – with the majority of this increase coming from the Medicaid expansion 
– compared with 2.0 percentage points for the higher income group. The gains in the other access 
outcomes appear to have been entirely concentrated among the lower income subsample. For this 
group, the effects on having a primary care doctor and an annual checkup were driven mostly by 
the private portion of the ACA while the reduction in cost barriers is driven mostly by the 
Medicaid expansion.  
The results on risky health behaviors and self-assessed health generally show the same 
null effects we saw in Table 3, with a few exceptions. For instance, among the lower income 
subsample, the private portion of the ACA increased drinks per month while the Medicaid 
expansion decreased drinking by a similar amount. Additionally, the Medicaid expansion 
increased smoking among the higher income subsample – a result that seems likely to be 
spurious since this group would not have qualified for Medicaid. A couple improvements in the 
self-assessed health outcomes emerge for the lower income subsample: an increase in the 
probability of reporting excellent health in non-Medicaid-expansion states and a reduction in 
days not in good mental health in expansion states. However, we are reluctant to emphasize these 
results since they do not seem to fit a broader pattern, and we would expect a couple significant 
“effects” to emerge simply by chance given the large number of null hypotheses we are testing in 
these tables.    
The patterns in Tables 9 and 10 – for those with less education versus more education – 
largely mimic the findings from our income stratification analysis. For those with less than a 
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college degree (which includes young individuals who may still be enrolled in school), the 
private portion of the ACA increased access to having a primary care doctor and an annual 
checkup; both the Medicaid and private portions increased insurance coverage and reduced cost 
barriers. Again, very few of the remaining outcomes on risky health behaviors or self-assessed 
health appear to have been affected. For those with a college degree, there are some muted 
effects on having a primary care doctor and cost barriers, but we largely see insignificant results. 
Tables 11 and 12 divide the sample by age, where the median individual in our sample 
was approximately 43 years old. For both young and old, there were sizable gains in coverage: 
8.5 percentage points from the full ACA for younger individuals and 7.2 percentage points for 
older ones. The full ACA also significantly increased the other access outcomes by roughly 
similar amounts among the two groups. However, there appears to be substantial heterogeneity 
in the extent to which these gains in access translated to improvements in health. There were no 
significant impacts of the private or public expansions in insurance on any risky health behavior 
or self-assessed health outcomes for the younger adults. In contrast, for the older half of our 
sample, the full ACA led to significant reductions in reports of days not in good physical health, 
not in good mental health, and with health-related limitations as well as an improvement in the 
composite health index. These gains appear to come mostly from the Medicaid rather than the 
private expansion. The evidence is less clear for the five-point self-reported measure of overall 
health: the private portion of the ACA increased the probabilities or reporting very good or 
excellent health, but the estimated effects of Medicaid expansion largely offset these gains so 
that the effects of the full ACA were insignificant. Nonetheless, the overall pattern of results 
appears to suggest an improvement in self-assessed health among the older half of our non-
elderly adult sample along at least some dimensions.  
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IX. DISCUSSION 
 In this paper, we used data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System to 
examine the effects of the 2014 ACA provisions on health care access, risky health behaviors, 
and self-assessed health. Using a DDD strategy that exploits variation in time, pre-treatment 
uninsured rates, and state Medicaid expansion status, we separately estimated the effects in both 
Medicaid expansion and non-expansion states. The results suggest that the ACA improved 
access to care along all observable dimensions – including health insurance coverage, having a 
primary care doctor and a well-patient checkup in the past year, and cost barriers – in both 
expansion and non-expansion states. The gain in coverage and reduction in cost barriers were 
significantly greater in expansion states. The magnitudes of the estimates imply effects of 
insurance on health care access that are at least as large as those observed in the Oregon 
Medicaid experiment. We did not observe any statistically or economically significant effects on 
the outcomes related to health behaviors or self-assessed health for the full sample of non-elderly 
adults. However, we did find evidence that the ACA improved self-assessed health among the 
older half of the sample in expansion states. 
 Our lack of significant results for risky health behaviors suggest that the ex ante moral 
hazard, improved access to health behavior-promoting medical care, and income effects brought 
about by insurance coverage either offset each other or are all relatively small. The extent of ex 
ante moral hazard may be modest because the consumption value of good health may be a 
sufficient deterrent even if an individual is insulated from the financial consequences of illness. 
Improved access to medical care may be of only limited value with regard to health behaviors 
since they are generally not as easy to treat as acute conditions. Income effects may also be 
relatively small given the mixed results in the literature as to the causal impact of income on 
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health behaviors and the potential for individuals to value in-kind spending on health insurance 
at less than its cost.17,18  
 Our inability to find clear evidence that the ACA improved self-assessed health contrasts 
the large, immediate gains in similar outcomes observed after the Oregon Medicaid experiment 
(Finkelstein et al., 2014) and Massachusetts reform (Van der Wees et al., 2013; Courtemanche 
and Zapata, 2014). The Oregon experiment was a unique context in that it was purely among 
low-income individuals who had demonstrated some interest in their health by actively 
registering for the lottery. The effects of the Massachusetts reform could plausibly differ from 
those of the ACA for several reasons, including differences in population demographics, the fact 
that the Massachusetts reform’s insurance expansions for adults were done completely through 
private coverage as opposed to a mix of public and private coverage, and the greater prevalence 
of high deductibles in the ACA’s private plans (Wharam et al., 2013). Another possible 
explanation is the relative lack of popularity of the ACA compared to these other interventions.19 
It has been hypothesized that the large, immediate gains in self-assessed health after insurance 
expansions may be attributable at least in part to a “warm glow” from gaining coverage (e.g. 
winning the lottery in Oregon, receiving insurance through a popular program in Massachusetts) 
rather than from actually utilizing additional medical care (Finkelstein et al., 2012; 
                                                          
17 See Cawley and Ruhm (2012) for an overview of the literature on the effect of income on risky health behaviors. 
Subsequent to their literature review, additional papers using natural experiments have continued to find mixed 
results (e.g. Au and Johnston, 2015; Averett and Wang, 2013; Kenkel et al., 2014; Apouey and Clark, 2015; Adams 
et al., 2012; Cowan and White, 2015). 
18 Around 84 percent of individuals with a Marketplace plan in 2015 qualified for an advance premium tax credit; 
conditional on qualifying, the advance PTC was $272 per month. See 
https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2016-Fact-sheets-items/2016-03-11.html. 
Gallen (2015) finds that each $1.00 of Medicaid spending is valued at $0.26-$0.35 to participants. 
19 Blendon et al. (2008) report that in June 2008, two years after the implementation of the Massachusetts health care 
reform, 69 percent of residents supported the law. In contrast, a tracking poll conducted by the Kaiser Family 
Foundation stated that in December 2016 only 43 percent of adults viewed the ACA favorably. For further 
information, on this poll see: http://kff.org/interactive/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-the-publics-views-on-the-
aca/#?response=Favorable--Unfavorable&aRange=twoYear.  
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Courtemanche and Zapata, 2014). Perhaps the amount of “warm glow” is smaller if the 
intervention bringing about the coverage is controversial, such as with the ACA.     
 Several caveats of our work provide directions for future research. For instance, 
investigation of clinical health outcomes is necessary to provide a fuller picture of the ACA’s 
health effects. Additionally, future studies should continue to track the indicators used in our 
paper over a longer time period, as the effects of insurance on health could take many years to 
fully materialize. Next, our identification strategy implicitly assumes that effects of the ACA are 
concentrated among those who lacked coverage prior to the law’s implementation. Future 
research should investigate whether impacts could also occur among, for instance, those who 
switched from catastrophic to more comprehensive coverage as a result of the ACA’s minimum 
standards for insurance plans, or who experienced significant income shocks as a result of the 
subsidies or changes in premiums.20 Finally, note that understanding the ACA’s effects on health 
care access and health outcomes provides only part of the story with regard to evaluating the 
welfare effects of the law. For instance, protection against financial risk is a critical component 
of the gains from insurance, so the consumption smoothing benefits of the ACA could confer a 
sizable benefit even in the absence of discernable short-run health effects. Hu et al. (2016) found 
evidence that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion improved financial outcomes from credit report 
data. On the other hand, Pauly (2017) questions whether or not the poor should be allowed to 
purchase high-deductible marketplace plans. The ACA also contains a number of other 
components unrelated to insurance coverage, such as provider payment reforms and tax 
                                                          
20 For instance, 7.7 percent of non-elderly adults directly purchased individual coverage prior to the 2014 reforms 
(author’s calculations using the ACS). For these individuals, the ACA’s premium tax credit could directly substitute 
for household income devoted to health insurance. While many of these people likely experienced positive income 
shocks, some may have been spending less on insurance prior to the ACA, perhaps because they were purchasing 
non-comprehensive policies (Clemans-Cope and Anderson, 2014). Thus, it is possible that the share of their budget 
spent on health insurance could have increased even in the presence of the subsidies.  
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increases, that each represent a part of the overall picture. Thus both the size and scope of the 
ACA have generated the need for a great deal of future research in order to better understand the 
multi-faceted nature of its impacts.        
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Figures 1 – Changes in Health Care Access and Health Behaviors Over Time By State Medicaid Expansion Status and Pre-
Treatment Uninsured Rate 
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Figures 2 – Changes in Self-Assessed Health Variables Over Time By State Medicaid Expansion Status and Pre-Treatment 
Uninsured Rate 
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Figures 3 – ACA Effects on Access and Risky Health Behaviors at Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rates 
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Table 1 – Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables By State Medicaid 
Expansion Status and Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate 
 Full 
Sample 
Medicaid 
Expansion;  
≥ Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured 
Medicaid 
Expansion; 
< Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured  
Non-
Expansion; 
≥ Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured 
Non-
Expansion; 
< Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured  
Any Insurance Coverage 0.788 
(0.409) 
0.791 
(0.407) 
0.868 
(0.339) 
0.710 
(0.454) 
0.805 
(0.396) 
Primary Care Doctor  0.741 
(0.439) 
0.745 
(0.436) 
0.826 
(0.378) 
0.682 
(0.465) 
0.754 
(0.431) 
Cost Barrier to Care in Past 
Year 
0.192 
(0.394) 
0.202 
(0.401) 
0.144 
(0.351) 
0.241 
(0.427) 
0.187 
(0.389) 
Well-Patient Doctor Visit in 
Past Year 
0.627 
(0.484) 
0.586 
(0.492) 
0.673 
(0.469) 
0.632 
(0.482) 
0.629 
(0.483) 
Overall Health Good or 
Better 
0.840 
(0.367) 
0.810 
(0.392) 
0.851 
(0.356) 
0.824 
(0.381) 
0.864 
(0.363) 
Overall Health Very Good 
or Better 
0.535 
(0.499) 
0.511 
(0.499) 
0.565 
(0.496) 
0.505 
(0.499) 
0.544 
(0.498) 
Overall Health Excellent 0.204 
(0.403) 
0.192 
(0.393) 
0.211 
(0.408) 
0.199 
(0.399) 
0.198 
(0.398) 
Days Not in Good Physical 
Health in Past Month 
3.660 
(7.964) 
4.489 
(8.639) 
3.940 
(8.073) 
4.149 
(8.362) 
4.099 
(8.326) 
Days Not in Good Mental 
Health in Past Month 
4.118 
(8.210) 
4.486 
(8.960) 
3.758 
(8.127) 
3.755 
(8.154) 
3.678 
(8.095) 
Days with Health-Related 
Limitations in Past Month 
2.518 
(6.797) 
3.066 
(7.505) 
2.553 
(6.877) 
2.572 
(6.463) 
2.570 
(6.975) 
BMI 27.875 
(6.282) 
28.002 
(6.331) 
27.848 
(6.208) 
28.202 
(6.462) 
28.187 
(6.435) 
Smoking Status 0.216 
(0.412) 
0.212 
(0.408) 
0.195 
(0.396) 
0.218 
(0.420) 
0.244 
(0.429) 
Drinks per Month 14.285 
(35.824) 
13.080 
(32.600) 
13.782 
(32.187) 
14.103 
(37.640) 
13.740 
(35.173) 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 2 – Effects of ACA on Health Care Access and Health Behaviors 
 Insurance 
Coverage 
Primary 
Care 
Doctor 
Cost 
Barrier 
Checkup BMI Smoker Alcoholic 
Drinks per 
Month 
Coefficient Estimates of Interest        
Medicaid Expansion * Post -0.013 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.011) 
0.019 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.016) 
0.003 
(0.113) 
-0.022* 
(0.009) 
0.087 
(0.538) 
Post * Pre-Treatment Uninsured 0.259*** 
(0.030) 
0.148** 
(0.049) 
-0.127*** 
(0.031) 
0.119* 
(0.051) 
-0.087 
(0.405) 
-0.0006 
(0.046) 
3.290 
(2.119) 
Medicaid Expansion * Post * Pre-
Treatment Uninsured 
0.152** 
(0.045) 
0.007 
(0.065) 
-0.123** 
(0.042) 
0.060 
(0.067) 
-0.040 
(0.528) 
0.054 
(0.045) 
-0.607 
(2.397) 
        
Implied Effects of ACA at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate     
ACA without Medicaid Expansion 0.053*** 
(0.006) 
0.030** 
(0.010) 
-0.026*** 
(0.006) 
0.024* 
(0.010) 
-0.018 
(0.082) 
-0.0001 
(0.009) 
0.667 
(0.429) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.031*** 
(0.009) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
-0.025** 
(0.009) 
0.012 
(0.014) 
-0.008 
(0.107) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.123 
(0.486) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid 
Expansion) 
0.083*** 
(0.010) 
0.031** 
(0.011) 
-0.051*** 
(0.010) 
0.036*** 
(0.009) 
-0.026 
(0.094) 
0.011 
(0.007) 
0.544 
(0.571) 
        
Pre-Treatment Mean and Standard 
Deviation of Outcome 
0.811 
(0.391) 
0.742 
(0.437) 
0.183 
(0.386) 
0.635 
(0.481) 
27.951 
(6.375) 
0.208 
(0.406) 
14.285 
(35.824) 
Sample Size 1,322,370 1,321,567 1,071,238 1,072,537 1,264,243 1,300,819 1,225,053 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5% 
level. BRFSS sampling weights are used. All regressions include state*location type and year*location type fixed effects as well as the controls. 
  
 46 
 
Table 3 – Effects of ACA on Self-Assessed Health 
 Good or 
Better 
Health  
Very 
Good or 
Better 
Health  
Excellent 
Health  
Days Not 
in Good 
Physical 
Health 
Days Not 
in Good 
Mental 
Health 
Days with 
Health-
Related 
Limitations 
Health 
Index 
Coefficient Estimates of Interest        
Medicaid Expansion * Post -0.005 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.171 
(0.111) 
0.006 
(0.210) 
-0.334* 
(0.165) 
0.031 
(0.021) 
Post * Pre-Treatment Uninsured -0.043 
(0.023) 
0.028 
(0.0327) 
0.038 
(0.025) 
-0.584 
(0.555) 
-0.396 
(0.763) 
-0.595 
(0.695) 
-0.003 
(0.096) 
Medicaid Expansion * Post * Pre-
Treatment Uninsured 
0.028 
(0.030) 
-0.036 
(0.041) 
0.014 
(0.033) 
0.336 
(0.537) 
-0.337 
(0.878) 
1.114 
(0.811) 
-0.070 
(0.104) 
        
Implied Effects of ACA at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate      
ACA without Medicaid Expansion -0.009 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.118 
(0.112) 
-0.080 
(0.155) 
-0.121 
(0.141) 
-0.006 
(0.020) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
0.068 
(0.108) 
-0.068 
(0.178) 
0.226 
(0.164) 
-0.014 
(0.021) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid 
Expansion) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.050 
(0.126) 
-0.149 
(0.126) 
0.105 
(0.154) 
-0.015 
(0.016) 
        
Pre-Treatment Mean and Standard 
Deviation 
0.841 
(0.366) 
0.537 
(0.499) 
0.204 
(0.403) 
3.634 
(7.948) 
4.071 
(8.169) 
2.500 
(6.777) 
-0.036 
(0.987) 
Sample Size 1,321,799 1,321,799 1,321,799 1,309,624 1,310,641 1,316,271 1,324,849 
See notes for Table 2. 
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Table 4 – Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Effect of Health Insurance  
on Health Care Access Outcomes  
 Primary Care 
Doctor 
Cost Barrier Checkup 
Any Insurance 0.446*** 
(0.080) 
-0.469*** 
(0.075) 
0.357*** 
(0.092) 
    
Sample Size 1,319,215 1,069,336 1,070,619 
First-Stage F Statistic 618.16 704.79 703.35 
Overidentification Test  P-Value 0.001 0.144 0.721 
      See notes for Table 2. 
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Table 5 – Event Study Regressions for Health Care Access and Health Behaviors 
 Insurance 
Coverage 
Primary 
Care 
Doctor 
Cost 
Barrier 
Checkup BMI Smoker Drinks 
per 
Month 
Coefficient Estimates of Interest (2013 is base year) 
2011 * Pre-Treatment Uninsured 0.018 
(0.069) 
-0.057 
(0.059) 
0.094 
(0.060) 
-0.296*** 
(0.087) 
0.602 
(0.723) 
0.035 
(0.043) 
-5.326 
(3.366) 
2012 * Pre-Treatment Uninsured -0.052 
(0.067) 
-0.022 
(0.081) 
-0.011 
(0.056) 
-0.173* 
(0.066) 
-0.950 
(0.622) 
0.022 
(0.046) 
0.926 
(4.642) 
2014 * Pre-Treatment Uninsured 0.193*** 
(0.046) 
0.115** 
(0.045) 
-0.129** 
(0.054) 
-0.0143 
(0.050) 
-0.435 
(0.723) 
0.010 
(0.050) 
8.360* 
(3.968) 
2015 * Pre-Treatment Uninsured 0.310*** 
(0.066) 
0.140 
(0.117) 
-0.106** 
(0.052) 
-0.021 
(0.088) 
-0.623 
(0.614) 
0.041 
(0.041) 
-3.211 
(3.336) 
Medicaid Expansion * 2011 * Pre-
Treatment Uninsured 
0.027 
(0.075) 
0.054 
(0.074) 
-0.047 
(0.045) 
0.096 
(0.081) 
-0.167 
(0.834) 
-0.046 
(0.048) 
0.462 
(5.479) 
Medicaid Expansion * 2012 * Pre-
Treatment Uninsured 
-0.001 
(0.106) 
0.113 
(0.103) 
-0.006 
(0.047) 
0.039 
(0.053) 
1.552 
(0.809) 
-0.094 
(0.052) 
-10.885 
(5.856) 
Medicaid Expansion * 2014 * Pre-
Treatment Uninsured 
0.134* 
(0.062) 
0.011 
(0.074) 
-0.005 
(0.050) 
0.046 
(0.060) 
-0.391 
(0.916) 
0.019 
(0.050) 
-8.835* 
(4.117) 
Medicaid Expansion * 2015 * Pre-
Treatment Uninsured 
0.197* 
(0.082) 
0.083 
(0.115) 
-0.142** 
(0.048) 
0.100 
(0.077) 
1.171 
(0.793) 
-0.024 
(0.042) 
-0.428 
(3.684) 
        
Implied Effects of ACA at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate     
ACA without Medicaid Expansion in 2014 0.039*** 
(0.009) 
0.023** 
(0.009) 
-0.026* 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.010) 
-0.088 
(0.146) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
1.695* 
(0.805) 
ACA without Medicaid Expansion in 2015 0.063*** 
(0.013) 
0.028 
(0.024) 
-0.022* 
(0.010) 
-0.004 
(0.018) 
-0.126 
(0.124) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
-0.651 
(0.677) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid Expansion) in 
2014 
0.066*** 
(0.012) 
0.026 
(0.015) 
-0.027*** 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.013) 
-0.009 
(0.128) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
-0.096 
(0.752) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid Expansion) in 
2015 
0.103*** 
(0.013) 
0.045** 
(0.014) 
-0.050*** 
(0.012) 
0.016 
(0.010) 
0.111 
(0.182) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.564 
(0.845) 
See notes from Table 2. 
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Table 6 – Event Study Regressions for Self-Assessed Health 
 Good or 
Better 
Health  
Very 
Good or 
Better 
Health  
Excell-
ent 
Health  
Days Not 
in Good 
Physical 
Health 
Days Not 
in Good 
Mental 
Health 
Days with 
Health-
Related 
Limitations 
Health 
Index 
Coefficient Estimates of Interest (2013 is base year)  
2011 * Pre-Treatment Uninsured 0.047 
(0.048) 
-0.062 
(0.047) 
-0.056 
(0.055) 
0.922 
(1.606) 
1.492 
(1.191) 
1.056 
(0.687) 
-0.105 
(0.166) 
2012 * Pre-Treatment Uninsured 0.025 
(0.062) 
0.134 
(0.076) 
0.059 
(0.044) 
1.477 
(1.664) 
1.120 
(0.769) 
1.375* 
(0.650) 
-0.009 
(0.157) 
2014 * Pre-Treatment Uninsured -0.039 
(0.038) 
0.080* 
(0.033) 
0.061 
(0.042) 
-.515 
(1.142) 
-0.213 
(0.836) 
-0.292 
(0.625) 
0.039 
(0.091) 
2015 * Pre-Treatment Uninsured -0.007 
(0.031) 
0.088 
(0.072) 
0.044 
(0.041) 
0.358 
(0.907) 
1.300 
(0.649) 
0.370 
(0.761) 
-0.098 
(0.074) 
Medicaid Expansion * 2011 * Pre-
Treatment Uninsured 
-0.048 
(0.057) 
0.007 
(0.070) 
0.124 
(0.69) 
-1.221 
(1.457) 
-0.686 
(1.309) 
-1.093 
(0.735) 
0.167 
(0.155) 
Medicaid Expansion * 2012 * Pre-
Treatment Uninsured 
-0.062 
(0.068) 
-0.087 
(0.089) 
0.002 
(0.061) 
0.447 
(1.383) 
-0.794 
(0.846) 
-0.361 
(0.552) 
0.009 
(0.016) 
Medicaid Expansion * 2014 * Pre-
Treatment Uninsured 
0.028 
(0.043) 
-0.081 
(0.059) 
0.045 
(0.051) 
0.715 
(1.236) 
-1.344 
(0.774) 
0.599 
(0.997) 
-0.046 
(0.125) 
Medicaid Expansion * 2015 * Pre-
Treatment Uninsured 
-0.025 
(0.052) 
-0.066 
(0.092) 
0.049 
(0.054) 
-0.072 
(1.062) 
-0.855 
(1.019) 
0.873 
(0.847) 
0.003 
(0.094) 
        
Implied Effects of ACA at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate     
ACA without Medicaid Expansion in 2014 -0.008 
(0.008) 
0.016* 
(0.007) 
0.013 
(0.009) 
-0.105 
(0.232) 
-0.043 
(0.170) 
-0.059 
(0.127) 
0.008 
(0.019) 
ACA without Medicaid Expansion in 2015 -0.001 
(0.006) 
0.018 
(0.015) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
0.073 
(0.184) 
0.263 
(0.132) 
0.075 
(0.154) 
-0.019 
(0.015) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid Expansion) in 
2014 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
-0.0002 
(0.011) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
0.040 
(0.176) 
-0.316* 
(0.134) 
0.063 
(0.199) 
-0.002 
(0.020) 
Full ACA (with Medicaid Expansion) in 
2015 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
0.004 
(0.014) 
0.019* 
(0.009) 
0.058 
(0.175) 
0.090 
(0.150) 
0.252 
(0.168) 
-0.019 
(0.019) 
See notes from Table 2. 
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Table 7 – Income Below Median Subsample 
(Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate = 0.316) 
 Insurance 
Coverage 
Primary Care 
Doctor 
Cost Barrier Checkup BMI Smoker Drinks per 
Month 
ACA w/o Medicaid    0.052** 
(0.017) 
0.041** 
(0.013) 
-0.016 
(0.009) 
0.046* 
(0.018) 
-0.006 
(0.153) 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
1.728* 
(0.693) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.067** 
(0.026) 
-0.002 
(0.021) 
-0.044* 
(0.017) 
-0.010 
(0.023) 
-0.091 
(0.209) 
0.019 
(0.014) 
-1.399* 
(0.643) 
Full ACA (w/ 
Medicaid) 
0.119*** 
(0.019) 
0.038* 
(0.017) 
-0.060** 
(0.019) 
0.035 
(0.018) 
-0.098 
(0.165) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
0.330 
(0.816) 
Pre-Treatment Mean 
and Standard Deviation 
0.674 
(0.469) 
0.664 
(0.472) 
0.289 
(0.453) 
0.581 
(0.493) 
28.344 
(6.766) 
0.276 
(0.447) 
12.508 
(37.676) 
Sample Size 672,937 672,627 548,521 549,596 638,395 660,975 640,349 
        
 Good or 
Better Health  
Very Good 
or Better 
Health  
Excellent 
Health  
Days Not in 
Good 
Physical 
Health 
Days Not in 
Good Mental 
Health 
Days with 
Health-
Related 
Limitations 
Health Index 
ACA w/o Medicaid  -0.004 
(0.008) 
0.012 
(0.011) 
0.012** 
(0.004) 
-0.316 
(0.159) 
-0.300 
(0.243) 
-0.388 
(0.247) 
0.026 
(0.026) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.002 
(0.015) 
0.004 
(0.012) 
0.187 
(0.245) 
-0.233 
(0.300) 
0.504 
(0.360) 
-0.014 
(0.037) 
Full ACA (w/ 
Medicaid) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
0.009 
(0.016) 
0.016 
(0.012) 
-0.129 
(0.232) 
-0.533* 
(0.233) 
0.116 
(0.282) 
0.012 
(0.029) 
Pre-Treatment Mean 
and Standard Deviation 
0.768 
(0.422) 
0.426 
(0.495) 
0.155 
(0.362) 
4.798 
(9.052) 
5.276 
(9.262) 
3.482 
(7.969) 
-0.249 
(1.077) 
Sample Size 672,765 672,765 672,765 663,572 664,825 668,102 674,849 
See notes from Table 2. 
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Table 8 – Income Above Median Subsample 
(Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate = 0.062) 
 Insurance 
Coverage 
Primary Care 
Doctor 
Cost Barrier Checkup BMI Smoker Drinks per 
Month 
ACA w/o Medicaid    0.026*** 
(0.006) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
-0.019 
(0.061) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.335 
(0.340) 
Medicaid Expansion -0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
0.010 
(0.017) 
0.084 
(0.101) 
0.015** 
(0.005) 
0.863 
(0.452) 
Full ACA (w/ 
Medicaid) 
0.020*** 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.012) 
0.065 
(0.110) 
0.020** 
(0.007) 
0.528 
(0.509) 
Pre-Treatment Mean 
and Standard Deviation 
0.933 
(0.249) 
0.837 
(0.369) 
0.070 
(0.255) 
0.684 
(0.465) 
27.289 
(5.580) 
0.141 
(0.348) 
16.474 
(33.297) 
Sample Size 649,433 648,940 522,717 522,941 625,848 639,844 627,768 
        
 Good or 
Better Health  
Very Good 
or Better 
Health  
Excellent 
Health  
Days Not in 
Good 
Physical 
Health 
Days Not in 
Good Mental 
Health 
Days with 
Health-
Related 
Limitations 
Health Index 
ACA w/o Medicaid  -0.006 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
-0.064 
(0.071) 
0.095 
(0.093) 
-0.017 
(0.057) 
-0.010 
(0.011) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
0.048 
(0.111) 
0.112 
(0.137) 
0.046 
(0.084) 
-0.022 
(0.013) 
Full ACA (w/ 
Medicaid) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.017 
(0.111) 
0.207 
(0.115) 
0.029 
(0.085) 
-0.032* 
(0.013) 
Pre-Treatment Mean 
and Standard Deviation 
0.931 
(0.254) 
0.675 
(0.468) 
0.266 
(0.442) 
2.214 
(6.000) 
2.651 
(6.330) 
1.283 
(4.605) 
0.234 
(0.778) 
Sample Size 649,034 649,034 649,034 646,052 643,712 648,169 650,000 
See notes from Table 2. 
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Table 9 – Non-College Graduate Subsample 
(Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate = 0.253) 
 Insurance 
Coverage 
Primary Care 
Doctor 
Cost Barrier Checkup BMI Smoker Drinks per 
Month 
ACA w/o Medicaid    0.059*** 
(0.007) 
0.030* 
(0.013) 
-0.025* 
(0.011) 
0.031* 
(0.013) 
-0.021 
(0.107) 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
1.053 
(0.606) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.040*** 
(0.013) 
0.001 
(0.017) 
-0.036* 
(0.015) 
0.010 
(0.016) 
0.067 
(0.152) 
0.013 
(0.012) 
-0.559 
(0.762) 
Full ACA (w/ 
Medicaid) 
0.100*** 
(0.014) 
0.032* 
(0.013) 
-0.062*** 
(0.015) 
0.040*** 
(0.011) 
0.046 
(0.120) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
0.494 
(0.803) 
Pre-Treatment Mean 
and Standard Deviation 
0.736 
(0.441) 
0.708 
(0.455) 
0.230 
(0.421) 
0.610 
(0.488) 
28.332 
(6.516) 
0.266 
(0.442) 
14.397 
(38.966) 
Sample Size 805,370 804,971 654,250 655,238 767,571 791,481 767,463 
        
 Good or 
Better Health  
Very Good 
or Better 
Health  
Excellent 
Health  
Days Not in 
Good 
Physical 
Health 
Days Not in 
Good Mental 
Health 
Days with 
Health-
Related 
Limitations 
Health Index 
ACA w/o Medicaid  -0.010 
(0.006) 
0.014 
(0.007) 
0.018*** 
(0.005) 
-0.231 
(0.145) 
-0.060 
(0.204) 
-0.154 
(0.192) 
0.007 
(0.023) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.011 
(0.012) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
0.127 
(0.156) 
-0.176 
(0.261) 
0.299 
(0.260) 
-0.017 
(0.028) 
Full ACA (w/ 
Medicaid) 
-0.000 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.014) 
0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.104 
(0.161) 
-0.236 
(0.175) 
0.146 
(0.239) 
-0.010 
(0.021) 
Pre-Treatment Mean 
and Standard Deviation 
0.802 
(0.398) 
0.393 
(0.488) 
0.168 
(0.373) 
4.254 
(8.592) 
4.682 
(8.787) 
2.967 
(7.396) 
-0.176 
(1.029) 
Sample Size 805,178 805,178 805,178 795,368 796,668 800,482 807,390 
See notes from Table 2. 
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Table 10 – College Graduate Subsample 
(Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate = 0.075) 
 Insurance 
Coverage 
Primary Care 
Doctor 
Cost Barrier Checkup BMI Smoker Drinks per 
Month 
ACA w/o Medicaid    0.021*** 
(0.003) 
0.017** 
(0.006) 
-0.010* 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.013 
(0.100) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.157 
(0.438) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
0.015 
(0.016) 
-0.181 
(0.116) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.870* 
(0.380) 
Full ACA (w/ 
Medicaid) 
0.027*** 
(0.004) 
0.011 
(0.006) 
-0.016* 
(0.007) 
0.022 
(0.014) 
-0.194 
(0.144) 
0.008 
(0.004) 
0.713 
(0.409) 
Pre-Treatment Mean 
and Standard Deviation 
0.922 
(0.268) 
0.791 
(0.406) 
0.096 
(0.294) 
0.669 
(0.471) 
26.709 
(5.492) 
0.087 
(0.283) 
14.005 
(26.468) 
Sample Size 517,000 516,596 416,988 417,299 496,672 509,338 500,654 
        
 Good or 
Better Health  
Very Good 
or Better 
Health  
Excellent 
Health  
Days Not in 
Good 
Physical 
Health 
Days Not in 
Good Mental 
Health 
Days with 
Health-
Related 
Limitations 
Health Index 
ACA w/o Medicaid  0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.013 
(0.010) 
0.067 
(0.083) 
-0.152 
(0.094) 
-0.099 
(0.054) 
-0.002 
(0.100) 
Medicaid Expansion -0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
0.013 
(0.011) 
0.013 
(0.139) 
0.196 
(0.142) 
0.201* 
(0.093) 
-0.013 
(0.016) 
Full ACA (w/ 
Medicaid) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.0003 
(0.008) 
0.080 
(0.145) 
0.044 
(0.161) 
0.102 
(0.092) 
-0.015 
(0.017) 
Pre-Treatment Mean 
and Standard Deviation 
0.938 
(0.242) 
0.709 
(0.454) 
0.296 
(0.457) 
2.118 
(5.736) 
2.660 
(6.233) 
1.912 
(5.776) 
0.325 
(0.754) 
Sample Size 516,621 516,621 516,621 514,256 513,953 515,789 517,459 
See notes from Table 2. 
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Table 11 – Age Below Median Subsample 
(Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate = 0.233) 
 Insurance 
Coverage 
Primary Care 
Doctor 
Cost Barrier Checkup BMI Smoker Drinks per 
Month 
ACA w/o Medicaid    0.056*** 
(0.006) 
0.022* 
(0.010) 
-0.033** 
(0.011) 
0.021 
(0.011) 
-0.032 
(0.098) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
0.882 
(0.591) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.029* 
(0.012) 
0.005 
(0.014) 
-0.022 
(0.015) 
0.019 
(0.015) 
0.009 
(0.149) 
0.018 
(0.013) 
-0.326 
(0.656) 
Full ACA (w/ 
Medicaid) 
0.085*** 
(0.013) 
0.027* 
(0.012) 
-0.055*** 
(0.014) 
0.040*** 
(0.011) 
-0.024 
(0.129) 
0.017 
(0.009) 
0.556 
(0.747) 
Pre-Treatment Mean 
and Standard Deviation 
0.757 
(0.429) 
0.675 
(0.468) 
0.208 
(0.406) 
0.577 
(0.494) 
27.449 
(6.273) 
0.225 
(0.417) 
15.194 
(37.965) 
Sample Size 652,429 652,082 531,312 531,987 618,804 640,852 622,490 
        
 Good or 
Better Health  
Very Good 
or Better 
Health  
Excellent 
Health  
Days Not in 
Good 
Physical 
Health 
Days Not in 
Good Mental 
Health 
Days with 
Health-
Related 
Limitations 
Health Index 
ACA w/o Medicaid  -0.003 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.285 
(0.216) 
-0.075 
(0.225) 
-0.240 
(0.200) 
0.014 
(0.033) 
Medicaid Expansion -0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
-0.004 
(0.011) 
0.283 
(0.184) 
-0.113 
(0.280) 
0.333 
(0.236) 
-0.037 
(0.033) 
Full ACA (w/ 
Medicaid) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.002 
(0.149) 
-0.188 
(0.189) 
0.093 
(0.195) 
-0.023 
(0.019) 
Pre-Treatment Mean 
and Standard Deviation 
0.874 
(0.332) 
0.571 
(0.495) 
0.226 
(0.418) 
2.943 
(6.921) 
4.130 
(8.042) 
2.061 
(5.958) 
0.012 
(0.929) 
Sample Size 652,707 652,707 652,707 647,944 647,941 650,873 670,911 
See notes from Table 2. 
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Table 12 – Age Above Median Subsample 
(Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate = 0.149) 
 Insurance 
Coverage 
Primary Care 
Doctor 
Cost Barrier Checkup BMI Smoker Drinks per 
Month 
ACA w/o Medicaid    0.037*** 
(0.010) 
0.036* 
(0.015) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
0.037* 
(0.015) 
-0.098 
(0.122) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
0.396 
(0.602) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.036** 
(0.011) 
0.002 
(0.015) 
-0.036** 
(0.012) 
0.004 
(0.019) 
0.120 
(0.182) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
0.585 
(0.767) 
Full ACA (w/ 
Medicaid) 
0.072*** 
(0.008) 
0.038** 
(0.012) 
-0.038*** 
(0.010) 
0.042*** 
(0.012) 
0.022 
(0.135) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
0.981 
(0.724) 
Pre-Treatment Mean 
and Standard Deviation 
0.847 
(0.360) 
0.861 
(0.346) 
0.162 
(0.368) 
0.717 
(0.450) 
28.635 
(6.235) 
0.200 
(0.400) 
12.640 
(31.553) 
Sample Size 669,941 669,485 539,926 540,550 645,439 659,967 645,627 
        
 Good or 
Better Health  
Very Good 
or Better 
Health  
Excellent 
Health  
Days Not in 
Good 
Physical 
Health 
Days Not in 
Good Mental 
Health 
Days with 
Health-
Related 
Limitations 
Health Index 
ACA w/o Medicaid  -0.009 
(0.005) 
0.016* 
(0.006) 
0.012** 
(0.004) 
-0.045 
(0.157) 
-0.117 
(0.127) 
-0.098 
(0.101) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.019* 
(0.007) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.295 
(0.179) 
-0.234 
(0.137) 
-0.194 
(0.118) 
0.028* 
(0.013) 
Full ACA (w/ 
Medicaid) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.340* 
(0.147) 
-0.351* 
(0.142) 
-0.292* 
(0.123) 
0.032* 
(0.013) 
Pre-Treatment Mean 
and Standard Deviation 
0.779 
(0.415) 
0.472 
(0.499) 
0.163 
(0.369) 
4.956 
(9.423) 
4.077 
(8.479) 
3.333 
(8.013) 
-0.124 
(1.080) 
Sample Size 669,092 669,092 669,092 661,680 662,700 665,398 653,938 
See notes from Table 2. 
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Appendix Table A1 – Summary Statistics for Control Variables By State Medicaid 
Expansion Status and Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate 
 Full Sample Medicaid 
Expansion;  
≥ Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured 
Medicaid 
Expansion; 
< Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured  
Non- 
Expansion; 
≥ Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured 
Non- 
Expansion; 
< Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured  
Age 25-29 0.105 
(0.306) 
0.107 
(0.308) 
0.104 
(0.303) 
0.107 
(0.300) 
0.105 
(0.307) 
Age 30-34 0.118 
(0.323) 
0.121 
(0.325) 
0.117 
(0.320) 
0.120 
(0.317) 
0.118 
(0.322) 
Age 35-39 0.107 
(0.302) 
0.106 
(0.306) 
0.102 
(0.299) 
0.103 
(0.296) 
0.099 
(0.302) 
Age 40-44 0.119 
(0.323) 
0.114 
(0.320) 
0.118 
(0.320) 
0.124 
(0.318) 
0.116 
(0.320) 
Age 45-49 0.108 
(0.309) 
0.103 
(0.304) 
0.108 
(0.305) 
0.108 
(0.306) 
0.106 
(0.303) 
Age 50-54 0.130 
(0.336) 
0.127 
(0.332) 
0.131 
(0.333) 
0.129 
(0.337) 
0.131 
(0.329) 
Age 55-59 0.104 
(0.304) 
0.105 
(0.306) 
0.106 
(0.302) 
0.098 
(0.308) 
0.104 
(0.297) 
Age 60-64 0.096 
(0.294) 
0.103 
(0.299) 
0.096 
(0.293) 
0.095 
(0.295) 
0.098 
(0.292) 
Female 0.497 
(0.499) 
0.491 
(0.499) 
0.497 
(0.499) 
0.499 
(0.499) 
0.498 
(0.499) 
Black 0.122 
(0.327) 
0.066 
(0.235) 
0.096 
(0.332) 
0.188 
(0.312) 
0.134 
(0.341) 
Hispanic 0.166 
(0.372) 
0.198 
(0.385) 
0.172 
(0.370) 
0.221 
(0.300) 
0.059 
(0.424) 
White 0.633 
(0.482) 
0.651 
(0.463) 
0.636 
(0.482) 
0.542 
(451) 
0.750 
(0.497) 
Married 
 
0.524 
(0.499) 
0.521 
(0.499) 
0.518 
(0.499) 
0.20 
(0.499) 
0.553 
(0.499) 
High school degree 
 
0.267 
(0.443) 
0.278 
(0.451) 
0.259 
(0.446) 
0.274 
(0.447) 
0.289 
(0.443) 
Some College 0.320 
(0.466) 
0.347 
(0.473) 
0.315 
(0.465) 
0.319 
(0.463) 
0.331 
(0.466) 
College graduate 
 
0.281 
(0.449) 
0.236 
(0.422) 
0.298 
(0.445) 
0.254 
(0.459) 
0.272 
(0.432) 
-- CONTINUED -- 
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Appendix Table A1 – Continued 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
 
 Full 
Sample 
Medicaid 
Expansion;  
≥ Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured 
Medicaid 
Expansion; 
< Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured  
Non- 
Expansion; 
≥ Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured 
Non- 
Expansion; 
< Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured  
No child  0.544 
(0.498) 
0.553 
(0.497) 
0.544 
(0.498) 
0.533 
(0.497) 
0.555 
(0.498) 
One child 0.181 
(0.385) 
0.175 
(0.382) 
0.182 
(0.387) 
0.185 
(0.384) 
0.177 
(0.390) 
Two children 0.166 
(0.372) 
0.166 
(0.366) 
0.168 
(0.371) 
0.167 
(0.370) 
0.160 
(0.372) 
Three children 0.072 
(0.257) 
0.070 
(0.257) 
0.071 
(0.258) 
0.075 
(0.252) 
0.069 
(0.262) 
Four children 
 
0.025 
(0.156) 
0.025 
(0.158) 
0.024 
(0.155) 
0.028 
(0.148) 
0.026 
(0.160) 
Unemployed 0.091 
(0.280) 
0.102 
(0.290) 
0.093 
(0.283) 
0.092 
(0.270) 
0.078 
(0.289) 
Unemployment rate 8.053 
(1.628) 
8.716 
(1.362) 
8.421 
(1.745) 
7.880 
(1.525) 
6.829 
(1.499) 
Student  0.051 
(0.221) 
0.051 
(0.213) 
0.055 
(0.239) 
0.048 
(0.240) 
0.045 
(0.241) 
Income 10k to less than 15k 0.058 
(0.235) 
0.067 
(0.231) 
0.056 
(0.233) 
0.067 
(0.209) 
0.055 
(0.253) 
Income 15k to less than 20k 0.080 
(0.271) 
0.095 
(0.261) 
0.072 
(0.273) 
0.098 
(0.255) 
0.081 
(0.285) 
Income 20k to less than 25k 0.089 
(0.286) 
0.110 
(0.274) 
0.081 
(0.287) 
0.103 
(0.276) 
0.098 
(0.294) 
Income 25k to less than 35k 0.103 
(0.304) 
0.120 
(0.294) 
0.097 
(0.304) 
0.112 
(0.294) 
0.109 
(0.310) 
Income 35k to less than 50k 0.134 
(0.340) 
0.141 
(0.329) 
0.129 
(0.341) 
0.136 
(0.341) 
0.148 
(0.337) 
Income 50k to less than 75k 0.154 
(0.360) 
0.151 
(0.351) 
0.156 
(0.359) 
0.139 
(0.369) 
0.165 
(0.346) 
Income more than 75k 0.309 
(0.460) 
0.242 
(0.476) 
0.337 
(0.461) 
0.268 
(0.476) 
0.281 
(0.448) 
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Appendix Table A2 – Implied Effect of ACA on Probability of Any Insurance at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate: 
Robustness Checks 
 Demogra-
phic 
Controls 
Only 
Demogra-
phic and 
Family 
Controls   
Demogra-
phic and 
Economic 
Controls 
Demogra-
phic and 
Exchange 
Controls 
Drop Cell 
Phone 
Sample 
<138% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<100% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<138% FPL 
Medicaid, 
>138% 
Private 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.048*** 
(0.007) 
0.048*** 
(0.008) 
0.052*** 
(0.006) 
0.053*** 
(0.006) 
0.062*** 
(0.006) 
0.052*** 
(0.006) 
0.053*** 
(0.006) 
0.048*** 
(0.006) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.031** 
(0.010) 
0.031** 
(0.011) 
0.028** 
(0.011) 
0.031*** 
(0.009) 
0.017 
(0.015) 
0.060*** 
(0.010) 
0.058*** 
(0.009) 
0.066*** 
(0.010) 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
0.079*** 
(0.009) 
0.080*** 
(0.010) 
0.080*** 
(0.010) 
0.083*** 
(0.010) 
0.078*** 
(0.014) 
0.112*** 
(0.010) 
0.111*** 
(0.010) 
0.114*** 
(0.010) 
Sample Size 1,333,480 1,328,980 1,322,370 1,322,370 852,953 1,322,370 1,322,370 1,322,370 
         
 Uninsured 
Rate from 
2011-2013 
State 
Baseline 
2013 
Uninsured 
Rate 
Drop 19-
25 Year 
Olds 
Drop All 
States with  
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
Treated 
States with 
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
States with 
Full Early 
Expansion  
Drop Late 
2014 and 
2015 
Expanders 
 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.056*** 
(0.008) 
0.039*** 
(0.005) 
0.056*** 
(0.006) 
0.052*** 
(0.007) 
0.048*** 
(0.005) 
0.049*** 
(0.005) 
0.052*** 
(0.006) 
 
Medicaid Expansion 0.034*** 
(0.009) 
0.064*** 
(0.013) 
0.029*** 
(0.008) 
0.034* 
(0.015) 
0.027* 
(0.010) 
0.024* 
(0.009) 
0.033 
(0.009) 
 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
0.089*** 
(0.009) 
0.103*** 
(0.011) 
0.086*** 
(0.008) 
0.085*** 
(0.015) 
0.075*** 
(0.011) 
0.073*** 
(0.010) 
0.084*** 
(0.010) 
 
Sample Size 1,322,370 1,322,370 1,227,845 746,174 1,129,957 1,207,428 1,274,613  
Notes: Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5% 
level. Sampling weights are used.  
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Appendix Table A3 – Implied Effect of ACA on Probability of having a Primary Care Doctor at Mean Pre-Treatment 
Uninsured Rate: Robustness Checks 
 Demogra-
phic 
Controls 
Only 
Demogra-
phic and 
Family 
Controls   
Demogra-
phic and 
Economic 
Controls 
Demogra-
phic and 
Exchange 
Controls 
Drop Cell 
Phone 
Sample 
<138% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<100% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<138% FPL 
Medicaid, 
>138% 
Private 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.028* 
(0.011) 
0.028* 
(0.011) 
0.028** 
(0.010) 
0.030** 
(0.010) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
0.036** 
(0.012) 
0.037** 
(0.012) 
0.033** 
(0.012) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.003 
(0.014) 
0.003 
(0.015) 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
0.019 
(0.018) 
0.006 
(0.018) 
0.005 
(0.017) 
0.010 
(0.017) 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
0.031** 
(0.011) 
0.031** 
(0.011) 
0.027* 
(0.010) 
0.031** 
(0.011) 
0.031** 
(0.015) 
0.042** 
(0.015) 
0.042** 
(0.015) 
0.043** 
(0.016) 
Sample Size 1,332,661 1,328,160 1,321,567 1,321,567 852,446 1,321,567 1,321,567 1,321,567 
         
 Uninsured 
Rate from 
2011-2013 
State 
Baseline 
2013  
Uninsured 
Rate 
Drop 19-
25 Year 
Olds 
Drop All 
States with  
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
Treated 
States with 
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
States with 
Full Early 
Expansion 
Drop Late 
2014 and 
2015 
Expanders 
 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.035*** 
(0.010) 
0.032** 
(0.010) 
0.035** 
(0.011) 
0.032** 
(0.012) 
0.029* 
(0.010) 
0.030** 
(0.010) 
0.029** 
(0.010) 
 
Medicaid Expansion 0.010 
(0.015) 
0.009 
(0.022) 
-0.006 
(0.014) 
0.001 
(0.015) 
0.008 
(0.015) 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
0.003 
(0.013) 
 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
0.044** 
(0.014) 
0.041** 
(0.018) 
0.029 
(0.011) 
0.033 
(0.017) 
0.037* 
(0.012) 
0.030* 
(0.011) 
0.031** 
(0.011) 
 
Sample Size 1,321,567 1,321,567 1,226,827 745,735 1,129,281 1,206,714 1,273,853  
See notes for Appendix Table A2. 
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Appendix Table A4– Implied Effect of ACA on Probability of having a Cost Barrier at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate:  
Robustness Checks 
 Demogra-
phic 
Controls 
Only 
Demogra-
phic and 
Family 
Controls   
Demogra-
phic and 
Economic 
Controls 
Demogra-
phic and 
Exchange 
Controls 
Drop Cell 
Phone 
Sample 
<138% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<100% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<138% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>138% 
Private 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
-0.021* 
(0.009) 
-0.021* 
(0.008) 
-0.025*** 
(0.006) 
-0.026*** 
(0.006) 
-0.010 
(0.011) 
-0.031*** 
(0.008) 
0.031*** 
(0.008) 
-0.027*** 
(0.007) 
Medicaid Expansion -0.027** 
(0.009) 
-0.028** 
(0.007) 
-0.024** 
(0.008) 
-0.025** 
(0.009) 
-0.050** 
(0.015) 
-0.031** 
(0.008) 
-0.029* 
(0.011) 
-0.035* 
(0.009) 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
-0.048*** 
(0.010) 
-0.049*** 
(0.010) 
-0.049*** 
(0.010) 
-0.051*** 
(0.011) 
-0.061*** 
(0.011) 
-0.061*** 
(0.012) 
-0.060*** 
(0.012) 
-0.062*** 
(0.012) 
Sample Size 1,079,266 1,075,533 1,071,238 1,071,238 715,800 1,071,238 1,071,238 1,071,238 
         
 Uninsured 
Rate from 
2011-2013 
State 
Baseline 
2013 
Uninsured 
Rate 
Drop 19-
25 Year 
Olds 
Drop All 
States with  
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
Treated 
States with 
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
States with 
Full Early 
Expansion 
Drop Late 
2014 and 
2015 
Expanders 
 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
-0.030*** 
(0.005) 
-0.018*** 
(0.005) 
-0.023*** 
(0.006) 
-0.020** 
(0.006) 
-0.024*** 
(0.006) 
-0.025*** 
(0.006) 
-0.026*** 
(0.006) 
 
Medicaid Expansion -0.023 
(0.011) 
-0.045** 
(0.012) 
-0.033** 
(0.010) 
-0.045* 
(0.017) 
-0.019* 
(0.008) 
-0.022* 
(0.010) 
-0.024** 
(0.009) 
 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
-0.053*** 
(0.011) 
-0.063*** 
(0.011) 
-0.055*** 
(0.010) 
-0.065** 
(0.020) 
-0.043*** 
(0.010) 
-0.048*** 
(0.012) 
-0.050*** 
(0.011) 
 
Sample Size 1,071,238 1,071,238 994,606 605,156 916,029 976,422 1,031,483  
See notes for Appendix Table A2. 
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Appendix Table A5 – Implied Effect of ACA on Probability of Having a Checkup at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate:  
Robustness Checks 
 Demogra-
phic 
Controls 
Only 
Demogra-
phic and 
Family 
Controls   
Demogra-
phic and 
Economic 
Controls 
Demogra-
phic and 
Exchange 
Controls 
Drop Cell 
Phone 
Sample 
<138% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<100% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<138% FPL 
Medicaid, 
>138% 
Private 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.021 
(0.013) 
0.021 
(0.012) 
0.024* 
(0.011) 
0.023* 
(0.011) 
0.047*** 
(0.010) 
0.011 
(0.012) 
0.012 
(0.012) 
0.007 
(0.012) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.012 
(0.014) 
0.013 
(0.014) 
0.013 
(0.013) 
0.012 
(0.013) 
-0.008 
(0.017) 
0.039* 
(0.015) 
0.035* 
(0.015) 
0.042** 
(0.014) 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
0.033*** 
(0.008) 
0.034*** 
(0.008) 
0.037*** 
(0.009) 
0.035*** 
(0.009) 
0.039* 
(0.015) 
0.050*** 
(0.011) 
0.047*** 
(0.012) 
0.049*** 
(0.012) 
Sample Size 1,080,580 1,076,836 1,072,537 1,072,537 716,568 1,072,537 1,072,537 1,072,537 
         
 Uninsured 
Rate from 
2011-2013 
State 
Baseline 
2013  
Uninsured 
Rate 
Drop 19-
25 Year 
Olds 
Drop All 
States with  
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
Treated 
States with 
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
States with 
Full Early 
Expansion 
Drop Late 
2014 and 
2015 
Expanders 
 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.021 
(0.011) 
0.014 
(0.007) 
0.023* 
(0.010) 
0.013** 
(0.010) 
0.021* 
(0.010) 
0.023* 
(0.011) 
0.024* 
(0.010) 
 
Medicaid Expansion 0.016 
(0.015) 
0.040* 
(0.017) 
0.013 
(0.015) 
0.018 
(0.017) 
0.012 
(0.015) 
0.008 
(0.014) 
0.016 
(0.014) 
 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
0.037*** 
(0.010) 
0.054*** 
(0.010) 
0.037*** 
(0.011) 
0.031 
(0.016) 
0.033** 
(0.011) 
0.032** 
(0.010) 
0.040*** 
(0.009) 
 
Sample Size 1,072,537 1,072,537 995,814 605,935 917,151 977,617 1,032,729  
See notes for Appendix Table A2. 
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Appendix Table A6 – Implied Effect of ACA on BMI at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate:  Robustness Checks 
 Demogra-
phic 
Controls 
Only 
Demogra-
phic and 
Family 
Controls   
Demogra-
phic and 
Economic 
Controls 
Demogra-
phic and 
Exchange 
Controls 
Drop Cell 
Phone 
Sample 
<138% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<100% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<138% FPL 
Medicaid, 
>138% 
Private 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
-0.004 
(0.086) 
-0.023 
(0.087) 
-0.009 
(0.082) 
-0.018 
(0.082) 
0.105 
(0.091) 
-0.105 
(0.101) 
0.105 
(0.091) 
-0.112 
(0.104) 
Medicaid Expansion -0.072 
(0.116) 
-0.032 
(0.111) 
-0.006 
(0.110) 
-0.008 
(0.107) 
-0.132 
(0.150) 
0.059 
(0.113) 
-0.132 
(0.150) 
0.054 
(0.111) 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
-0.075 
(0.108) 
-0.055 
(0.105) 
-0.002 
(0.099) 
-0.026 
(0.094) 
-0.027 
(0.112) 
-0.046 
(0.108) 
-0.027 
(0.112) 
-0.057 
(0.113) 
Sample Size 1,269,733 1,267,091 1,264,243 1,264,243 816,228 1,264,243 1,264,243 1,264,243 
         
 Uninsured 
Rate from 
2011-2013 
State 
Baseline 
2013  
Uninsured 
Rate 
Drop 19-
25 Year 
Olds 
Drop All 
States with  
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
Treated 
States with 
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
States with 
Full Early 
Expansion 
Drop Late 
2014 and 
2015 
Expanders 
 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
-0.046 
(0.085) 
-0.045 
(0.101) 
-0.101 
(0.099) 
-0.043 
(0.099) 
-0.059 
(0.078) 
-0.047 
(0.079) 
-0.052 
(0.078) 
 
Medicaid Expansion -0.029 
(0.110) 
0.164 
(0.151) 
0.025 
(0.146) 
-0.117 
(0.128) 
0.009 
(0.130) 
0.005 
(0.106) 
0.008 
(0.111) 
 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
-0.075 
(0.103) 
0.118 
(0.097) 
-0.076 
(0.119) 
-0.160 
(0.154) 
-0.050 
(0.121) 
-0.042 
(0.098) 
-0.044 
(0.094) 
 
Sample Size 1,264,243 1,264,243 1,174,488 714,021 1,079,665 1,154,853 1,218,323  
See notes for Appendix Table A2. 
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Appendix Table A7 – Implied Effect of ACA on Probability of being as Smoker at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate: 
Robustness Checks 
 Demogra-
phic 
Controls 
Only 
Demogra-
phic and 
Family 
Controls   
Demogra-
phic and 
Economic 
Controls 
Demogra-
phic and 
Exchange 
Controls 
Drop Cell 
Phone 
Sample 
<138% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<100% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<138% FPL 
Medicaid, 
>138% 
Private 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.002 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
-0.000 
(0.009) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.012) 
0.002 
(0.012) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.007 
(0.011) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
0.011 
(0.009) 
0.019* 
(0.009) 
0.011 
(0.012) 
0.010 
(0.012) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.011 
(0.009) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.013 
(0.009) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
0.014 
(0.010) 
Sample Size 1,307,003 1,304,045 1,300,819 1,300,819 841,849 1,300,819 1,300,819 1,300,819 
         
 Uninsured 
Rate from 
2011-2013 
State 
Baseline 
2013  
Uninsured 
Rate 
Drop 19-
25 Year 
Olds 
Drop All 
States with  
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
Treated 
States with 
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
States with 
Full Early 
Expansion 
Drop Late 
2014 and 
2015 
Expanders 
 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.000 
(0.010) 
0.000 
(0.010) 
-0.000 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
 
Medicaid Expansion 0.013 
(0.010) 
0.019 
(0.013) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.017 
(0.010) 
0.011 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.011 
(0.009) 
 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
0.014 
(0.008) 
0.019* 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.018 
(0.009) 
0.011 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.013 
(0.007) 
 
Sample Size 1,300,819 1,300,819 1,207,869 736,307 1,110,938 1,188,282 1,253,655  
See notes for Appendix Table A2. 
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Appendix Table A8 – Implied Effect of ACA on Number of Drinks per Month at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate: 
Robustness Checks 
 Demogra-
phic 
Controls 
Only 
Demogra-
phic and 
Family 
Controls   
Demogra-
phic and 
Economic 
Controls 
Demogra-
phic and 
Exchange 
Controls 
Drop Cell 
Phone 
Sample 
<138% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<100% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<138% FPL 
Medicaid, 
>138% 
Private 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.720 
(0.456) 
0.670 
(0.445) 
0.619 
(0.423) 
0.667 
(0.430) 
-0.464 
(0.779) 
0.521 
(0.508) 
0.542 
(0.509) 
0.425 
(0.509) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.029 
(0.509) 
0.061 
(0.504) 
-0.167 
(0.481) 
-0.123 
(0.486) 
1.940 
(1.063) 
-0.983 
(0.476) 
-0.162 
(0.528) 
-0.013 
(0.479) 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
0.749 
(0.496) 
0.732 
(0.505) 
0.452 
(0.545) 
0.544 
(0.571) 
1.476 
(0.752) 
0.422 
(0.648) 
0.379 
(0.677) 
0.413 
(0.674) 
Sample Size 1,273,660 1,270,939 1,268,117 1,268,117 821,086 1,268,117 1,268,117 1,268,117 
         
 Uninsured 
Rate from 
2011-2013 
State 
Baseline 
2013  
Uninsured 
Rate 
Drop 19-
25 Year 
Olds 
Drop All 
States with  
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
Treated 
States with 
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
States with 
Full Early 
Expansion 
Drop Late 
2014 and 
2015 
Expanders 
 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.520 
(0.473) 
0.115 
(0.468) 
0.485 
(0.728) 
0.743 
(0.479) 
0.795 
(0.478) 
0.707 
(0.429) 
0.774 
(0.444) 
 
Medicaid Expansion -0.278 
(0.546) 
0.612 
(0.643) 
-0.022 
(0.787) 
-0.731 
(1.021) 
-0.187 
(0.587) 
0.132 
(0.529) 
-0.245 
(0.489) 
 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
0.242 
(0.634) 
0.726 
(0.557) 
0.463 
(0.651) 
0.012 
(0.982) 
0.608 
(0.777) 
0.839 
(0.623) 
0.529 
(0.613) 
 
Sample Size 1,268,117 1,268,117 1,178,584 718,539 1,082,450 1,158,646 1,221,714  
See notes for Appendix Table A2. 
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Appendix Table A9 – Implied Effect of ACA on Probability of Having Good or Better Health at Mean Pre-Treatment 
Uninsured Rate: Robustness Checks 
 Demogra-
phic 
Controls 
Only 
Demogra-
phic and 
Family 
Controls   
Demogra-
phic and 
Economic 
Controls 
Demogra-
phic and 
Exchange 
Controls 
Drop Cell 
Phone 
Sample 
<138% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<100% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<138% FPL 
Medicaid, 
>138% 
Private 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
-0.012* 
(0.005) 
-0.010 
(0.005) 
-0.009 
(0.005) 
-0.009 
(0.005) 
-0.015 
(0.008) 
-0.009* 
(0.004) 
-0.009* 
(0.004) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.007 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.010 
(0.012) 
0.013 
(0.007) 
0.014 
(0.007) 
0.012 
(0.006) 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.007) 
Sample Size 1,332,950 1,328,431 1,321,799 1,321,799 852,112 1,321,799 1,321,799 1,321,799 
         
 Uninsured 
Rate from 
2011-2013 
State 
Baseline 
2013 
Uninsured 
Rate 
Drop 19-
25 Year 
Olds 
Drop All 
States with  
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
Treated 
States with 
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
States with 
Full Early 
Expansion 
Drop Late 
2014 and 
2015 
Expanders 
 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.004) 
-0.010 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.009* 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
 
Medicaid Expansion 0.010 
(0.006) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
0.005 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
 
Sample Size 1,321,799 1,321,799 1,226,723 745,721 1,129,381 1,206,947 1,274,025  
See notes for Appendix Table A2. 
 
  
 66 
 
Appendix Table A10 – Implied Effect of ACA on Probability of Having Very Good or Better Health at Mean Pre-Treatment 
Uninsured Rate:  Robustness Checks 
 Demogra-
phic 
Controls 
Only 
Demogra-
phic and 
Family 
Controls   
Demogra-
phic and 
Economic 
Controls 
Demogra-
phic and 
Exchange 
Controls 
Drop Cell 
Phone 
Sample 
<138% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<100% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<138% FPL 
Medicaid, 
>138% 
Private 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
Medicaid Expansion -0.005 
(0.009) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
-0.006 
(0.011) 
-0.002 
(0.011) 
-0.006 
(0.011) 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
-0.008 
(0.010) 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
-0.002 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
Sample Size 1,332,950 1,328,431 1,321,799 1,321,799 852,112 1,321,799 1,321,799 1,321,799 
         
 Uninsured 
Rate from 
2011-2013 
State 
Baseline 
2013  
Uninsured 
Rate 
Drop 19-
25 Year 
Olds 
Drop All 
States with  
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
Treated 
States with 
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
States with 
Full Early 
Expansion 
Drop Late 
2014 and 
2015 
Expanders 
 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
 
Medicaid Expansion -0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
-0.009 
(0.009) 
-0.011 
(0.012) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.009) 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
0.000 
(0.011 
-0.008 
(0.015) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
-0.004 
(0.010) 
 
Sample Size 1,321,799 1,321,799 1,226,723 745,721 1,129,381 1,206,947 1,274,025  
See notes for Appendix Table A2. 
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Appendix Table A11 – Implied Effect of ACA on Probability of Having Excellent Health at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured 
Rate:  Robustness Checks 
 Demogra-
phic 
Controls 
Only 
Demogra-
phic and 
Family 
Controls   
Demogra-
phic and 
Economic 
Controls 
Demogra-
phic and 
Exchange 
Controls 
Drop Cell 
Phone 
Sample 
<138% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<100% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<138% FPL 
Medicaid, 
>138% 
Private 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
Medicaid Expansion -0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.017 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
0.008 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
0.010 
(0.008) 
0.013 
(0.009) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
Sample Size 1,332,950 1,328,431 1,321,799 1,321,799 852,112 1,321,799 1,321,799 1,321,799 
         
 Uninsured 
Rate from 
2011-2013 
State 
Baseline 
2013 
Uninsured 
Rate 
Drop 19-
25 Year 
Olds 
Drop All 
States with  
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
Treated 
States with 
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
States with 
Full Early 
Expansion 
Drop Late 
2014 and 
2015 
Expanders 
 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.009 
(0.005) 
0.013* 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
0.010 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
 
Medicaid Expansion -0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.008) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.017 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.010 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
 
Sample Size 1,321,799 1,321,799 1,226,723 745,721 1,129,381 1,206,947 1,274,025  
See notes for Appendix Table A2. 
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Appendix Table A12 – Implied Effect of ACA on the Number of Days Not in Good Physical Health at Mean Pre-Treatment 
Uninsured Rate:  Robustness Checks 
 Demogra-
phic 
Controls 
Only 
Demogra-
phic and 
Family 
Controls   
Demogra-
phic and 
Economic 
Controls 
Demogra-
phic and 
Exchange 
Controls 
Drop Cell 
Phone 
Sample 
<138% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<100% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<138% FPL 
Medicaid, 
>138% 
Private 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
-0.012 
(0.135) 
-0.052 
(0.127) 
-0.131 
(0.113) 
-0.118 
(0.113) 
-0.155 
(0.110) 
-0.173 
(0.135) 
-0.173 
(0.135) 
-0.216 
(0.126) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.045 
(0.118) 
0.079 
(0.116) 
0.057 
(0.107) 
0.068 
(0.109) 
0.229 
(0.260) 
0.053 
(0.150) 
0.053 
(0.152) 
0.061 
(0.136) 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
0.033 
(0.144) 
0.027 
(0.142) 
-0.075 
(0.132) 
-0.050 
(0.126) 
0.074 
(0.247) 
-0.120 
(0.144) 
-0.120 
(0.145) 
-0.156 
(0.146) 
Sample Size 1,320,243 1,316,045 1,309,624 1,309,624 844,163 1,309,624 1,309,624 1,309,624 
         
 Uninsured 
Rate from 
2011-2013 
State 
Baseline 
2013 
Uninsured 
Rate 
Drop 19-
25 Year 
Olds 
Drop All 
States with  
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
Treated 
States with 
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
States with 
Full Early 
Expansion 
Drop Late 
2014 and 
2015 
Expanders 
 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
-0.142 
(0.113) 
-0.241 
(0.125) 
-0.111 
(0.120) 
-0.074 
(0.137) 
-0.171 
(0.121) 
-0.118 
(0.118) 
-0.138 
(0.116) 
 
Medicaid Expansion 0.045 
(0.116) 
0.114 
(0.177) 
0.164 
(0.130) 
0.030 
(0.224) 
0.127 
(0.121) 
0.036 
(0.097) 
0.009 
(0.114) 
 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
-0.097 
(0.130) 
-0.127 
(0.143) 
0.053 
(0.144) 
-0.044 
(0.250) 
-0.044 
(0.146) 
-0.082 
(0.128) 
-0.046 
(0.130) 
 
Sample Size 1,309,624 1,309,624 1,215,345 738,477 1,118,979 1,195,925 1,262,176  
See notes for Appendix Table A2. 
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Appendix Table A13 – Implied Effect of ACA on the Number of Days Not in Good Mental Health at Mean Pre-Treatment 
Uninsured Rate:  Robustness Checks 
 Demogra-
phic 
Controls 
Only 
Demogra-
phic and 
Family 
Controls   
Demogra-
phic and 
Economic 
Controls 
Demogra-
phic and 
Exchange 
Controls 
Drop Cell 
Phone 
Sample 
<138% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<100% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<138% FPL 
Medicaid, 
>138% 
Private 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
-0.008 
(0.016) 
-0.026 
(0.146) 
-0.076 
(0.156) 
-0.008 
(0.155) 
0.030 
(0.122) 
-0.094 
(0.213) 
-0.102 
(0.206) 
-0.097 
(0.212) 
Medicaid Expansion -0.115 
(0.164) 
-0.085 
(0.162) 
-0.057 
(0.176) 
-0.068 
(0.178) 
-0.149 
(0.282) 
-0.250 
(0.226) 
-0.224 
(0.217) 
-0.256 
(0.212) 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
-0.123 
(0.120) 
-0.111 
(0.124) 
-0.133 
(0.120) 
-0.149 
(0.126) 
-0.120 
(0.259) 
-0.344* 
(0.162) 
-0.326 
(0.169) 
-0.353* 
(0.169) 
Sample Size 1,321,277 1,317,107 1,310,641 1,310,641 844,984 1,310,641 1,310,641 1,310,641 
         
 Uninsured 
Rate from 
2011-2013 
State 
Baseline 
2013  
Uninsured 
Rate 
Drop 19-
25 Year 
Olds 
Drop All 
States with  
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
Treated 
States with 
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
States with 
Full Early 
Expansion 
Drop Late 
2014 and 
2015 
Expanders 
 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
-0.157 
(0.180) 
-0.284 
(0.193) 
-0.106 
(0.184) 
-0.072 
(0.164) 
-0.050 
(0.165) 
-0.078 
(0.155) 
-0.103 
(0.152) 
 
Medicaid Expansion -0.092 
(0.183) 
-0.066 
(0.239) 
0.050 
(0.200) 
-0.063 
(0.211) 
0.028 
(0.191) 
-0.043 
(0.174) 
-0.067 
(0.183) 
 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
-0.249 
(0.130) 
-0.350 
(0.131) 
-0.057 
(0.132) 
-0.136 
(0.158) 
-0.022 
(0.133) 
-0.121 
(0.131) 
-0.170 
(0.134) 
 
Sample Size 1,310,641 1,310,641 1,216,192 739,295 1,119,831 1,196,872 1,263,185  
See notes for Appendix Table A2. 
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Appendix Table A14 – Implied Effect of ACA on the Number of Days with Health-Related Limitations at Mean Pre-
Treatment Uninsured Rate:  Robustness Checks 
 Demogra-
phic  
Controls 
Only 
Demogra-
phic and 
Family 
Controls   
Demogra-
phic and 
Economic 
Controls 
Demogra-
phic and 
Exchange 
Controls 
Drop Cell 
Phone 
Sample 
<138% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<100% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<138% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>138% 
Private 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
-0.035 
(0.132) 
-0.052 
(0.127) 
-0.129 
(0.143) 
-0.121 
(0.141) 
0.073 
(0.101) 
-0.158 
(0.195) 
-0.159 
(0.192) 
-0.179 
(0.193) 
Medicaid Expansion 0.176 
(0.176) 
0.198 
(0.176) 
0.206 
(0.177) 
0.226 
(0.164) 
-0.107 
(0.238) 
0.116 
(0.202) 
0.119 
(0.179) 
0.114 
(0.191) 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
0.141 
(0.182) 
0.146 
(0.189) 
0.076 
(0.179) 
0.105 
(0.154) 
-0.035 
(0.213) 
-0.042 
(0.200) 
-0.040 
(0.192) 
-0.065 
(0.206) 
Sample Size 1,320,243 1,316,045 1,309,624 1,309,624 844,163 1,309,624 1,309,624 1,309,624 
         
 Uninsured 
Rate from 
2011-2013 
State 
Baseline 
2013 
Uninsured 
Rate 
Drop 19-
25 Year 
Olds 
Drop All 
States with  
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
Treated 
States with 
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
States with 
Full Early 
Expansion 
Drop Late 
2014 and 
2015 
Expanders 
 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
-0.165 
(0.165) 
-0.138 
(0.207) 
-0.059 
(0.142) 
0.027 
(0.186) 
-0.168 
(0.143) 
-0.069 
(0.148) 
-0.157 
(0.140) 
 
Medicaid Expansion 0.229 
(0.168) 
-0.094 
(0.252) 
0.274 
(0.166) 
0.360 
(0.254) 
0.303 
(0.169) 
0.273 
(0.156) 
0.280 
(0.162) 
 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
0.064 
(0.165) 
-0.232 
(0.175) 
0.121 
(0.165) 
0.386 
(0.235) 
0.136 
(0.180) 
0.204 
(0.132) 
0.121 
(0.161) 
 
Sample Size 1,309,624 1,309,624 1,215,345 738,477 1,118,979 1,201,881 1,262,176  
See notes for Appendix Table A2. 
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Appendix Table A15 – Implied Effect of ACA the Health Index at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate:  Robustness Checks 
 Demogra-
phic  
Controls 
Only 
Demogra-
phic and 
Family 
Controls   
Demogra-
phic and 
Economic 
Controls 
Demogra-
phic and 
Exchange 
Controls 
Drop Cell 
Phone 
Sample 
<138% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<100% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>100% 
Private 
<138% 
FPL 
Medicaid, 
>138% 
Private 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
-0.015 
(0.022) 
-0.010 
(0.019) 
0.001 
(0.019) 
-0.001 
(0.019) 
0.017 
(0.025) 
0.001 
(0.026) 
0.001 
(0.026) 
0.004 
(0.025) 
Medicaid Expansion -0.004 
(0.110) 
-0.011 
(0.20) 
-0.013 
(0.021) 
-0.014 
(0.021) 
-0.013 
(0.032) 
0.007 
(0.027) 
0.005 
(0.027) 
0.005 
(0.026) 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
-0.019 
(0.020) 
-0.021 
(0.019) 
-0.012 
(0.017) 
-0.015 
(0.016) 
0.004 
(0.020) 
0.007 
(0.021) 
0.006 
(0.022) 
0.009 
(0.022) 
Sample Size 1,320,243 1,316,045 1,309,624 1,309,624 844,163 1,309,624 1,309,624 1,309,624 
         
 Uninsured 
Rate from 
2011-2013 
State 
Baseline 
2013 
Uninsured 
Rate 
Drop 19-
25 Year 
Olds 
Drop All 
States with  
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
Treated 
States with 
Early 
Expansion 
Drop 
States with 
Early Full 
Expansion 
Drop Late 
2014 and 
2015 
Expanders 
 
ACA without Medicaid 
Expansion 
0.008 
(0.022) 
0.017 
(0.025) 
0.004 
(0.023) 
-0.008 
(0.023) 
0.001 
(0.021) 
-0.005 
(0.021) 
-0.002 
(0.020) 
 
Medicaid Expansion -0.007 
(0.023) 
0.014 
(0.030) 
-0.018 
(0.024) 
-0.027 
(0.028) 
-0.018 
(0.023) 
-0.013 
(0.021) 
-0.018 
(0.021) 
 
Full ACA (with 
Medicaid Expansion) 
0.001 
(0.018) 
0.004 
(0.020) 
-0.013 
(0.017) 
0.035 
(0.025) 
-0.017 
(0.019) 
-0.018 
(0.017) 
-0.017 
(0.017) 
 
Sample Size 1,309,624 1,309,624 1,215,345 738,477 1,118,979 1,209,699 1,262,176  
See notes for Appendix Table A2. 
 
